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This Program Ver_flcation Dc)cument de_alls the result._ of the
ASTP flight program verification specified in the Pro._ram \rcrlflc_t,',n
Plan for the ASTP t=lig, ht Program, IBM No. 75\V-000()5 and ro\-ised by
: 7%V-00032.
The ASTP flight program verification effort was a complete
verification.
The independent simulator used in performing flight progr,,m
verification is an all digital simulation utilizing an IBM Syst,-m 370/
Model 155 Co:nputcr. The simulator program mathematically models
both _he vehicle (6D) and the LVDC and is referred to as the 6D/LVDC
simulator. A detailed description of the simulator is contained in
Appendix B of the AST D Flight Program Verification Plan (PVP).
Null_e. rt)t.ls support prourt_ms were used _n vc'r_f_cat_or by
sumn_-trlzin_ data for rapid ;,n._lysis ,_nd by mak:ng indep_,ndent c._lcu-
lat_tms t_) aid m evulttatltm of flight program pcrfo,'mance. Some
programs, where applicable, are duplicated on different cc_mputer
systems to en.sure accessibility reg;_rdless of worklo:_d or m;_chinc
It down time. A description of t.ach support progr;tm is conlamcd in
Appendix C of the PVP.
One of the primary _neans for determinant, the ;,¢t('qt_acy of the
flight program _as by an analysis of tht, S-IVB end _ondit_ons. A( h_e\'cd
LVDC terminal end conditi¢,ns w_.re ¢alculdted by ,_n _ndepcnd_'nl ._t)p(,rt
program for (.ach pcrforn:ance case which re,tch('d S-IVB cut(_ff. _I'1_,
achieved terminal end conct_li_ms were cornpar_,d a,.,a_nst Ill,. des_r(.d
terminal end conditions and the d_fferences art, l_stcd _n App_.nd_x D.
1975025041-009
' _ I ! I
1
t
,i. N75 33115
-_ _ SECTION 1
GENERAI, VERIFICATION DESCRIPTION
;_ 1.1 INTRODUCTION
This section contains a brief, general description of ASTP verification.
The goal of the verification effort was to assure that the flight program,
by meeting all mis3ion requirements, will not be the limiting factor in
achieving the missLon, even "n the presence of other vehicle failures.
The discussion follows the outline in the Program Verification Plan for
the ASTP Flight }_rograms (IBM No. 75W-00005).
1.2 TYPICAL MISSION REQUIREMENTS
The total program verification effort assures the accuracy and adequacy of
the LVDC flight program and verifies that the final program meets mission
requirements and conforms to program documentation. The results are
also applied to guidance error analysis.
Verification methods and results of the verification _ffort performed on the
three mission phases (prelaunch targeting, boost-to-earth orbit, and orbitalop rations) are discussed in the remaining sections of this document.
1.3 GENERAL FLIGHT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
1.3.1 Applicable Document List
The documents used directly in verification of the ASTP flizht pro,,ram ;trc
listed in Appendix A. The specification document was the LVDC Equation
Defining Document (EDD) for the Saturn IB Flight Programs (Reference 1),r,:,,,._]on
,l (AS'FP missl(m), as modified by the :\S'Ft _ t'l:ght Pr_r,tm t"han.-e R_'quc._t,-
{Ft_CRs). The A:,t,'_mics System Ilandbot,k (R-tort.net, 2) was used durln,, v,.r,fl(.,-
tion phase._ ,,s ,,n aid f_r interpretat_(.m of the ._l)et tli¢aticm._, The l_r,Jar,,t:m_cr'a
,Opcratln_ Manual (Rcit, rence 3) was ubt'd t,, intt'rL_ret :)rc_r,,_,_mln,, t_.( t_niques.
1.3.2 Program Functional Requirements
The flight program's functional requirements to integrate the guidance and
control system with the launch vehicle sequencing ,_ystem were verified
directly by analysis of ninny special logic checks designed for this purpos,.
and indirectly by the correct overall program response to nominal and
numerous perturbed conditions {performance cases). Discussions and r_'-
, sults of the verification performed in ,-ach area are contained in the remain-
"_, ing sections of this document.
1-1
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The program's recurring functions through the mission are:
• Navigation
• Guidance
• Attitude Control
• Launch Vehicle Sequencing
• Telemetry
• Pro 'rammed backup.,, to sF.ecif;.c hardware functions
• Command Processing
• Data Compression
Verification of these functions was accomplished in part by overall program
performance, in part by special logic tests, and in part by specially designed
independent digital programs (refer to Appendix C of the PVP) which analyzect
flight program data.
t. 3.3 Requirements Interaction
Verification of the interaction of function requirements was accomplished
nn every case run during the verification effort. Functions which require
fixed repetition rates, such as the minor loop and the orbital guidance, were
verified on special test cases. Other test cases, and mrfornmnce cases
sequenced events were checked to assure detection of
which one-time each
event within the specified ttme frame. To ensure tha: the variable repeti-
tion rate is always consistent ,vith accuracy requirements, plots were gene-
rated showing each major loop cov._putation cycle length. These plots were
generated by the PLOTS portion of the SUPER support program for each
performance case as described in Appendix C of the PVP.
1.4 PROGRAMMING GROUND RULES
Verification of adherence to programmed ground rule requirements was
accomplished as outlined in the following _ubparagraphs:
I. Duplex computer operation in the flight mode was checked by
an independent computer program which ensured that the
simplex/duplex rhode selection hit was on in the operand
address of each Change Data Sector (CDSI instruction and
in each flop Constant (HPCI. Assurance that the flight pro-
gram was initiated in the duplex mode of operation was ob-
tained by decoding the ttPC executed as a result of the GRI_
interrupt.
Z. Use of the Generalized Flight I)rogram (GFP) concept ant] dt. vel-*it
_l opment of the GFP assembler have greatly minimizt.d the effort
required to add new requirements and delete old requirements.
I-Z
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Minimized verification effort and better quality control for pro-gram changes was achieved through development :,nd us,, of the
symbolic tape compare prograH, ,_escribed in Appen,li× C uf tl,c
PVP.
3. Verification of program variable scaling was accomi,lished using
two methods. Each time an accumulator overflow was executed
within the 6D/LVDC simulator, all applicable data (instruction
location, accumulator contents, etc. ) ",,gas printed for subsequent
analysis. All overflows were justified through analysis of the
program listing, This verification method ensured that the
assigned scaling can accommodate the maximum ,,ariable values
experienced in both nominal and perturbed performance simula-
tions. Attainment of r._aximum accuracy and program efficiency
was verified through a comparison of the simulated vehicle (6D)
state parameters with those computed by the LVDC flight pro-
gram. The difference in these parameters (navigation errors)
was within the accepted mission tolerances in all performance
1,
cases which had no perturbations to the inertial platform. The
accuracy of the 6D is well established and thus provided an
adequate check on the accuracy of the flight program parameter
scaling.
,_ 4. Corrrct implementation of the algoritLms used to compute trig-
onometric functions and the dot product routine was vorified using
the same metl,ods described in subparagraph (3) of 1.4 and by
checking algorithm out:_uts after forcing particular known inp_ts.
5. Flight Program listings were analyzed to ensure that all instruc-
tions where var'ous priority levels of interrupts could destroy
or alter existing data are interrupt protected.
4_
1-3
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Z. 1 INTRODUCTION
Several coordinate systems and transformation matrices are defined for
the Saturn IB mission. The verificatioa accomplished to assure correct
computation of the many geometrical relationships of these functions is
discussed in this section.
2.2 REFERENCE SYSTEMS
The flight program correctly represents and uses all the various three
dimensional vector functions mentioned in this section in solving the equa-
tions of motion. Verification was accomplished by demonstrating the
following:
(a) The program has the ability to correctly establish an initial
vector coordinate system from external input data for use
az a reference.
(b) The logic is capable of properly executing the cal-program
culations necessary to translorm vectorial parameters
from one coordinate system to another.
(c) The presettings used for vector component calculations are
valid.
Item (a) above was verified by the flight program initialization case described
in Section 3. Items (b) and (c) were verified as described below.
2.3 TRANSFORMATION MATRICES
Vectors calculated by the flight program are correctly transformed from one
coordinate system to another by operating on the known vector with the appro-
priate transformation matrix. Verification of the transformation matrices
are accomplished as discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.3.1 [MSG] Matrix
The [MSG] matrix correctly transforms vectors from the S-system to the
G-system. Since the [MSG] matrix and the [MG4] matrix are multiplied to
, form the [MS4] matrix, verif:,cation of the [MS4] matrix (see paragraph
Z.3.6) indirectly verified the [MSG] matrix.
_4
2-1
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, _ Z.3.2 [MG4] Matrix
The [MG4] matrix correctly transforms vectors from the G-system to, tile
4-system. See the discussion above for the [MSG] matrix.
2.3.3 [MBS] Matrix
This matrix is used in the acceleration profile computations in the simulation
qight mode only. Since this matrix is not used in the flight mode, no
verification was performed.
Z.3.4 [MBS ] Matrix
a
The [MBS a] matrix correctly transforms vectors from the B-system to the
S-system using the rotation through average gimbal angles. Verification was
accomplished by ensuring correct backup velocity calculations and checking
individual matrix elements.
2.3.5 [M4V_ Matrix
The [M4V] matrix correctly transforms vectors from the 4-system to the
V-system. This matrix is used to transform position and velocity vectors
• ] for terminal guidance calculations; accurate guidance end conditions (see
"_ | Appendix D) and checking the individual elements verified the [M4V] matrix.
2.3.6 [MS4] Matrix
_' The [MS4] matrix correctly transforms vectors from the S-system to the
4-system. Accurate guidance end conditions on each performance case
(see Appendix D) verified the [MS4] matrix since this matrix is used in
calculating position (T_4) and velocity (94) which are used in the active guid-
ance routines. Individual elements were checked to verify correct imple-
mentation of the matrix.
2.3.7 [MGA] Matrix
The [MGA] matrix correctly transforms vectors from the G-system to the
A-system. Correct telemetry station acquisition and loss calculations
and checking individual elements verified correct implementation of this
matrix.
Z-Z
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Z: Z 3.8 [MSV] Matrix
!
_ The [MSV] matrix is obtained by multiplying the [biS4]by the [M4V] matrix.
"_ IGM parameters are calculated in the V-system as a function of navigation
parameters in the S-system. Accurate guidance end conditions (see Appen-
dix D) and checking individual elements verified correct implementation of
this matrix.
Z.3.9 [MEG] Matrix
- This matrix is not actually _mplemented in the flight program and therefore,
verification is not required.
2.3.10 [MES_ Matrix
This matrix is not actually implemented in the flight program and therefore,
verification is not required.
4 ,l
t
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3. I INTRODUCTION
This section describes verification of the preflight prepare-to-launch/fllght
pregram interfacing, targeting load, and flight program initialization.
Since there is no requirement in flight program verification to verify the
error paths and logic implementation within the preflight routines, these
were not verified.
3.2 TARGETING LOAD
The digital command system (DCS) is the primary method for loading tar-
geting data into the LVDC. The target load command itselfwas not verified
as itis used in the prefligi_tmode only (see Section I0.4.12). The targeting
load command was issued during all time periods of flight mode (boost and
orbital) to verify that the command was not enabled by the flight program.
A flight program patch was then used to enable the targeting laad command
during the orbital flightmode. A targeting load command was issued fol-
lowed by a memory dump command to verify correct storage of the target-
ing parameters. Correct utilization of the targeting load data was verified.
; 3.3 PREFLIGHT PREPARE-TO-LAU?;CH
Verification of a]l of the requirements for computations and system checks
described in this paragraph was accomp]ished using the 6D/LVDC
simulator. The _,D/I,VDC ,im_ilator m(),,!tors ;,11 error lnd_c:tions
from the prepare-to-launch routine and h;,lts sequcnc_n;, _r error,,
exist.
3.3.1 GMT Synchronizing
Real-time accumulation in the prepare-to-launch mode was checked by con_-
paring the value of accumulated time from the LVDC with the time in pre-
uare-to-launch as computed by the 6D/LVDC simulator. The handlin_ of
this time as it is passed from the prelaunch r,mtines to the flight program
was checked by a trace through phase I initialization. Platform gimbal
angle readings made in prelaunch are also passed over to the flight program
and were verified in the same maP.net.
3.3.2 Azimuth I_aying Support
Preflight azimuth computations were verifie0 by comparing the telemetered
azimuth with independent computations obt:_ ined using identical input quan-
tities to both programs.
3-1
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3. 3. 3 Variable Data Tape
, A ,'isual inspection of the flight proeram listing was madt, to verify that
the specified locations are reserved for each parameter. Thc l,_,_J_inal
: simulations rtm were made using the data on the variable data tape for
: the July 15 lamach date.
3.4 FLIGItT PROGRAM INITIALIZATION
A program trace through phase I imtialization was used to verif 7 that Time
Base 0 (TB0) was started properly, the accelerometers were read, the
descending node of*he desired orbit was calculated, ;_nd the remaining
flight quantities were initialized. The trace verified that upon completion
of flight program initialization, the LVDC/LVDA Firing Commit Enable
Discrete Output (DO12) was set and the boost mode calculations began.
The MS4 and MSG matrices were verified as described in Section 2.
": Maneuver an_les from the variable data tape (patched to include all four
quadrants) were traced to insure correct handling by the sine/cosine
rout_ les durine initialization.
1975025041-017
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J SECTION 4
BOOST NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This section discusses the effort involved to assure that the boost rood(.
of the flight program correctly provides navigation and guidance functions
for the vehicle during periods when significant, measurable accelerations
exist. Many test cases and performance cases were made, testing the
ability of the navigation and guidance routu_,.s to properly compensate for
several perturbations. Various plots of parameters of special interest
were made on all performance cases, which facilitated a check on each
calculation (each boost major loop) of these parameters.
4.2 ACCELEROMETER DATA DESCRIPTION
Each step in the processing of the platform accelerometer readings, from
the read to the computation of vehicle acceleration, was checked separately.
Some steps were checked directly, by test cases, others were checked in-
j directly, by comparison to results in the 6D simulator.corresponding
Each step correctly performs its function under both nominal and perturbed
conditions.
4,2,1 Accelerometer Data Format
The flight program reads the inertial platform accelerometers and separates
the obtained bit configuration into the A and B optisyn readings. The differ-
ences between the current and past values for each reading, &A and AB,
are correctly computed and represent the measured velocity change during
the last computation cycle to the nearest 0,05 m/s. Verification of the cor-
rect program utilization of the A-optisyn readings was verified by hand
computations on accelerometer test cases and by a favorable con_pariscm
(within accepted mission tolerances) between 6D and LVDC navigation para-
meters on all other cases. The B-optisyn readings were verified by simu-
lating an A-optisyn failure and che, king that the navigation parameters
continue to compare wid_in accepted mission tolerances.
4.2.2 Accelerometer Data Processing
The following paragraphs discuss the vcrifica,tion accomplished to assure the
correct execution of the disagreement, zero and reasonableness tests on the
velocity data changes.
4-1
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4. 2. 2.1 I)isagreemc.nt Test
The disagreement test correctly selects the measured change ('A or ,B)
closest to the expected change for zero and reasonableness testing, l.ogic
tests which forced differences between the delta's of -3, -2, -1, +1, 42,
and 43 in each axis, were run to verify that the proper channels w_re
selected and that the appropriate mode code bits were set.
4.2.2.2 Zero Test
The zero test correctly determines the acceptance or rejection of those
velocity changes of one pulse or less depending upon time, vehicle attitude,
and expected thrust misalignment. Special logic tests were run which
forced &A and _3 to be +1, 0 and -1 at times during boost when a zero
change was acceptable and at times when a zero change was unacceptable.
Tests were also run which forced 2A and .',B to be +2 and -2 at times when
a zero reading was unacceptable. Use of the zero readings and the backup
velocity parameter for navigation purposes was verified by hand
computations.
The test which determines if the vehicle is within a 2 ° band of the plumb-
line coordinate system axis was verified by checkin_ that the zero read-
ings were accepted when the expected changes were 1,'ss than -Ace (the
estimated uncertainty in the expectf.d change computation due to thrust
misalignments) and that the zero readings were rejec'ed when the ,.xpec-
ted changes were greater than Ace and the zero test is enabled. Oth,.r
tests were made involving outboard engine failures to verify proper chan u,.s
to the parameter used in the zero test logic for exp,.cted thrust misaliun-
ment (_,.VSND). Mode Code 24 bits were properly set for each case.
Other cases were run which monitored various parameter and "flag" chan_es
throughout the mission to verify the bypassing of the zero test anti the
additional zero test logic durin_ the particular times specified in the
Evel,ts Sequence Timeline table.
There were no unexpected zero test failures in any of the cases simulat,.d.
" 4.2. 2. 3 Reasonableness Test
The reasonableness test correctly determines if the velocity change s,.lect,.d
by the disagreement and zero tests falls within a band of 4500_ of th,. expt'c-
ted chan_e enlarged by a reasonableness test constant (RT'C) multipli,.d by
AT. Verifi ._tion of the reasonableness test was accomplished by forcing
the selected change to be just within and just without th_ reasonable limits
for both increasing and decreasxne changes. Hand calculations wt. rt. per-
formed to verify the use of the backup velocity in place of the unreasonabl,,
changes. Proper bit settings in ,MC2.I were also verified for each condition.
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The RTC values are changed as specified in the Event Sequence Timeline
table. This verification was accomplished by a series of cases which
[ monitor various parameter cLanges throughout the mission.
There were no unexpected reasonableness test failures in any of the cases
simulated.
4.2. 3 Velocity Accumulation
The velocity accumulations in the flight program are correctly conw rt_ d
from pulses to platform velocity components Xm, "_m, and Zm or, (in th_
case of accelerometer failures), from the backup acclaim, ration paramet_.r
to platform velocity. Verification was accompliched by comparing actual
(6D) velocity components in the platform systf.m to the flight program
velocity accumulations or, (in the case of acce!c, rom_,t_.r failures, by hand
computations.
4. 2.4 F/M Calculations
The vehicle acc_,l_.ration (F/M) is correctly calculatc.d by dividin_ the root
sum squar,, of the, diff_.renc,, b,.tw,-_,n the. r_res_,nt and past val,l_.s of Xm,
_/m, and Z m by the length of the prc,vious comptltation cycle. V_.rificatio.n
was accomplish_.d by comparing the actual (6D) F/M with th,. flight program
F/M on all cas,.s.
During periods of flight in which the F/M computations may be unusually
noisy, the preset constants for F/M are used as specified in the Event
Sequence Timeline table and the Presetting table. These F/M constants
were verified by a series of cases which monitor various p,_rameter changes
throughout the mission. The accuracy of these presettings was verified by
comparing the actual value of acceleration at thrust b,_ildup to the preset
value.
4.2. 5 M/F Smo,_t.hin_ Calculations
The initializaticm of the smoothed recipr_,cal value of ti,e measured vehicle
acceleration (M/F)s, and all of the independent variables used in the calcu-
latAon of (M/F)s , was verified by the cases which monitor parameters
such as those for changes. The initialization value, magnitude and rate
of change limits, and the time to start (M/F)s calculations were verified
to the specifications i._ the Presetting table and Events Sequence Timeline
table of the EDD.
4.2.6 _'}c Acceleration
is co,'r¢.ctly c_mput_,d fron_ prestored fnrct.t_ackup acceleration (F/M) c
mass, mass flow rate, and comput(,d l_.rformanc_. Facte)r valu_.s. "Ih(,
preeisi(m of th(' backup accelt, ration prc_fil_, was verifi_,d, via plots, hy
comparison to the actual a_c_.l_,ration profile for non_inal fli_:ht. The
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,- - value nf (F/M)c during TBO and the specified values of force, mass,
and mass flow rate used to compute the backup acceleration were verified
by the cases which monitor various parameter ehan_es throughout the
missio_.
The backup velocity is correctly resolved through the measured gimbal
angles. Each component is used correctly for the computation of the
boost navigation parameters on all accelerometer failure cases. A
failure was forced in each axis through all periods of boost with one cast.
for each axis to check the navigational accuracy of using the backup
acceleration.
The backup acceleration profile is correctly adjusted for S-IIB engine
failures. The backup force {Fb) , backup mass flow rate (M), and
Performance Factor are adjusted by SIBE©B for the first detected S-IB
engine failure. Verification was accomplished by a series of engine
failure cases during different time segments.
4.3 BOOST NAVIGATION
During boost, the flight program correctly determines the vehicle position
and velocity relative to the plumbline coordinate system (S-system). The
following paragraphs discuss the effort to assure corr_.ct implt.mentation
of the trapezoidal integration scheme and the gravitational acceh, ration
model used to compute these navigation parameters.
4. 3. 1 Integration
The trapezoidal integration scheme implemented in the flight program
correctly determines the vehicle position and velocity from initial con-
ditions, accelerometer data and earth gravitation. The basic tool used
for verification of the boost navigation functions of the flight program is
a comparison between the 6D and LVDC navigat;on parameters. The 6I)
uses essentially the same navigation equatmns that are specified for the
flight program but has greater accuracy due to a faster integration rate,
additional harmonic terms in the gravitation acceleration n_od,.l, double
precision floating point arithmetic, and the quantization l_.vel of the LVDC
accelerometer readir, gs (one pulse represents 0.05 m/s}.
4.3.2 Gravitational Acceleration
The potential function of the earth that is used to mod_.l gravitational
acceleration is correctly calculated during the. boost pt. riods of flight.
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The sam(. gravitational acceleration model is used for both the flight pro-
grain and the 51) simulator. During the boost pba_,,'_., the (,D simulator,
however, uses the. third and fourth terms in the poteatial expansion wherea._
the flight program uses only the first two. The calculations for gravitation
acceleration were verified indirectly by a favorable comparison (within th,.
accuracy allo_ved) of the navigation parameters.
4.4 BOOST GUIDANCE
The flight program properly guides the launch w:hicle to the drsired
orbital conditions by generating the necessary steering commands.
Verification of the guidance functions was accomplished as discussrd
in the following paragraphs.
4.4. 1 .First St__age Guid_____ance
The roll maneuw_r to al!gn the launch vehicle along the specified azimuth
and the preprogramm,d timr tilt guidance, includ!ng adjastments for
engine failures, are all executrd properly. Verification of these functions
is discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.4. 1. 1 Roll Maneuver
The roll guidance command ib correctly initializf,d to the last roll plat-
form gimbal an_le comp_ltcd in the Prepare-to-I ,tunch routin_, (sef.
Section 3). This initial command is held (frozen) until the w.hicle has
ch;ared the launch tower (the w'hicle has increased its position along
the vertical plumbline (Xs) axis GANTRY mrtors), or until thr time from
liftoff is greater than or eqt,al to the specified time guard, at which tim_.
the roll guidance command is properly set to zerc.
Verification of th,. corr_.t _ command at towf.r clt.arance and at the tim,
guard wa,: accomplishrd, t)rop,.r setting of mode code bits was w. rified
on all cases.
4.4. 1.2 Time Tilt Pitch Guidance
The time tilt pitch computations begin un(h.r the identical requiren_ents as
the initiation of the roll maneuver. The initiation time was verified as
discussed in the previous section.
The pitch guidance commant 1- duriag the first stagr burn, ,_t ich art- designed
to yield a gravity terlll biased for expected winds, are computed correctly
as functions of time from prestored polynomt,tls. The 6D/LVI)C sitnulat_,r,
which has the capability of simulating the expected winds for
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the st)ecified launch month, was used to verify t'l pitch comn_an,ls.
From the initiation of tim(. tilt pitch guidance until the tilt arrest timr,
tile- g,.:idanc.o commands in the minor loop wer(, :¢,nlpar,.d aKail_bt a ti_J_
tilt pitch profile. The two compared within the specified tolerancr.
4.4. 1. 3 Time Tilt Yav, Guidance
The yaw guidance commands are correctly computed from tables as a
function of time (Tc). For this mission, the yaw table is set to zero.
The yaw table logic was verified by inputting known tahles and indepen-
dently solving equation 4.4. 2. 1 (Reference 1) with these known tables,
ensuring that the yaw conamand profile was within a specified t_and of
the tabular profile.
4.4. 1.4 Engine Out Guidance Modifications.
The guidance commands are correctly adjustod for S-II_ engine, failures.
Verification was accomplished by a series of engine failure, cases durinL:
each segment of thr en_,ine failure frerz_, tinle function and during each
segment of the tilt arrest time bias function, t_ropr- engine out drt_,ct-
ion, a(tjustm¢.nts to the backup acceleration (F/M)c, modr cod(" bit
settings, and adjustments to I).VSND were also verified.
4.4.2 Iterativ(- Guidance Mod,. (IGM)
Correct impl,.mentation of the actiw. _:uidance sch,.mt, in the flight pro-
gram was verified as discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.4.2.. 1 General Description of IGM
The IGM scheme correctly performs its two general functions: IGM guidance
computation and IGM phasing. Both functions are dependent upon numer(ms
variables, most of which change considerably with vehicle perturbations.
Conse,luently , the guitlance scheme was verified indirectly by looking at t_e
overall program performance. The basic verification tc,ol used to analyze
overall program performance was a set ,_f plots includin,, all significant
intermediate IGM parameters, all phasing parameters, and all guidance
parameters for each performance case. The graphs were plotted by com-
puter as a function of time from GRR and contains one value for each com-
putation cycle.
The parameters listed in the PVP were plotted for IGM analysis for each per-
formance case. Definitions of the parameters are cow. red in the I':_)D.
The plots of these parameters ':ere analyzed by an oxamination of their c,,r-
responding mathen_atical equations (see Section 1 3 of the FIll)). bTach inflec-
tion point, "spikt,, " or other unusual action of the parameter was explained
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by checking _.hatitreacted in the manner dictated by the appropriate equation.
The effects of IGM phasing, artificial tau modes, thrust level changes, and
performance perturbations on each parameter were studicd to ensure proper
response.
4.4.2.2 Basic IGM Guidance Calculations
The IGM guidance commands required to steer the vehicle into the dee[red
orbit are calculated correctly during each computation cycle. These guidance
commands were checked by a very close critique of some oi the aforementioned
plots.
All preset guidance parameters (those ,:,htch are assigned an initial value) are
initialized correctly. These prescttings were verified by observation on the
nominal and/or performance cases or by the special cases which check various
: parameters for charges throughout the mission.
The final test of the accuracy of the guidance calculations is evidenced by the
c!osc agreement of the achieved (LVDC) terminal conditions on all performance
cases to the desired conditions (see Appendix D).
4.4.2.3 Basic IGM Phasing
IGM phasing calculations _nd logic properly determine what parameters repre-
sent vehicle performance and correctly sequences IGM calculations. The ini-
tializationof the smoothed reciprocal value of the measured vehicle accelera-
tion, (M/F)s, and all of the independent variables used in the calculation of
(M/F)s were verified by the cases which monitor these parameters. The
initialization values and the times to start (M/F) s calculations properly
conform to the specifications in the Presetting table and Events Sequence
Timeline table of the EDD.
IGM phase initiation times, mode code bit settings, artificial tau phasing,
X-steering initiation time, and the high speed loop initiation time are all exe-
cutcd properly. Verification was accomplished by close observation of the
applicable data printed each computation cycle on every 6D/LVDC performance
case. fhe effects of all the above phasing on the total IGM guidancc was
checked on each performance case via plots.
4.4.2.4 Terminal Steering and Cutoff
The initiation time of _(-steering and the zeroing of the position correction terms
during g-steering was verified on each performance case.
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The S-IVB cutoff prediction correctly enables the vehicle to attain the
velocity required for injection into the desired orbit. The calculations
for and the issuance of the S-IVB velocity cutoff command in the high
speed loop were verified on the performance cases by checking the exact
time of issuance of the S-IVB velocity cutoff command in the high speed
loop were verified on the performance cases by checking the exact time
of issuance of the switch selector command. An independent program,
which uses flight program position and velocity data from the high speed
loop and the S-IVB cutoff switch selector command time, calculated the
achieved cutoff velocity by extrapola[ion. This velocity compared favorably
with the desired cutoff velocity on all performance cases.
An additional check on the S-IVB fine cutoff prediction scheme was accom-
plished by a comparison of the achieved terminal conditions with the desired
terminal conditions. These conditions are derived by extrapolating the
state vector (radius and velocity components) at cutoff to the time that ttr-
minal velocity is reached considering the velocity bias (AVb) for thrust tailoff.
The differences are shown in Appendix D and the close comparison indirectly
verifies the adequacy of the fine cutoff scheme.
The start time of the high speed loop (HSL) was verified on every performance
case considering the time bias AT b. The velocity guard logic for the high
speed loop was verified by program trace.
4.4.3 Guidance Reference Failure.(GRF)
Guidance reference failures were forced in several cases to verify that DO4 and
DO6 are set, bit 14 of Mode Code 27 is set, attitude error commands are frozen
and DI9 (spacecraft control of Saturn) is checked. After DI9 is set, the program
zeroes the attitude error command and sets bit 15 of Mode Code 27.
Special GRF cases were run forcing a GRF prior to and during the high
speed loop (HSL) to den-onstrate the following:
• In response to a GRF before HSL initiation, entrance to the
HSL was inhibited and DI9 tests were enabled.
• In response to a GRF during the HSL, the GRF was recog-
nized, and the HSL continued until cutoff.
4.4.4 Steering Misalignment Correction (SM9)
The steering misalignment correction (SMC) properly compensates for
errors caused by the misalignment of the thrust vector with the vehicle
l
longitudinal axis. The calculations for the SMC terms were verified by
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hand calculations made at various points in the flight (where SMC compu-
tations are active). Good terminal conditions on the nominal and the
performance cases indirectly verified the SMC calculations.
The correct setting and resetting of bit i0 in MCZ5, the nominal sequencing
of the SMC computations, and the inhibiting of SMC computations for pro-
gram limiting and active hardware failures are performed correctly.
4.4.5 Chi Computations
Steering commands (_(y4and _z4) con_puted in IGM are properly converted
into the platform gimbal system and the SMC terms are correctly added to
the guidance commands. Assurance that the yaw command is limited to
a maximum magnitude of 45 ° was obtained by a special trace of program
logic.
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ORBITAL NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This section describes the verification performed for the following orbital
functions:
• Orbital flight mode initialization
• Orbital navigation
• Orbital guidance
• Telemetry acquisition
Verification of other orbital functions is discussed in the appropriately
named sections.
5.2 ORBITAL PROCESSING RATES
The flight program's ability to accomplish the processing required for each
orbital function at the specified rates was verified utilizing the output from
the 6D/LVDC simulator. The minor loop and minor loop support cases de-
scribed in Section 8 were used to verify correct implementation of the timing
logic for these two modules. Once this was accomplished, only the time
controlling constants used by these modules required further investlgation.
Simulations made across each area of constant replacement were used to
verify correct processing rate control for the minor loop and minor loop
support modules. The execution rate for orbital guidance computations
was verified using 6D/LVDC simulator data. These cases were also used
to check the processing rates for position extrapolation, orbital navigation,
discrete processing, gimbal angle read, and telemetry acquisition and loss
determination. Verification of these cases waa preceded by a flight pro-
gram coding check to ensure that the guidance and navigation parameters
are telemetered when computed. Event sequencing and interrupt processing
during orbital flight phases were indirectly verified by the minor loop cases.
a check on correct switch selector command issuance, and the DCS interrupt
tests described in Section 10. Adherence to the Event Sequence Timeline in
Reference 1 was ensured for each orbital function.
5.3 ORBITAL INITIALIZATION
Proper parameter initialization for orbital navigation calculations was veri-
fied by analyzin_ a proeram listin_ and by utilizln_ the navigation error
computation features incorporated _n the t,D/I.VI)C simulator. The
differences between the flight proeram computed values and the parallel
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and independently computed {,D program \'allies wer," printed for each
computation cycle. Plots of the error funclions across the orbital
initialization period we:e used for ,letection of possible _.rrors in1
naxigation componen: initialization and scaling.
5.4 ORBITAL NAVIGATION
Implementation of the orbital naxqgation scheme was verified using the con-
cept that if the end result is good, then all of the individual considerations
are correctly accomplished. However, a flight pro_:ram trace of the
applicable modules was used as an additional means of validating the
computations employed in the orbital navi£,:,_mg scheme. The 6D/LVDC
simulator comparec" the navigation param ter calculations of both
computing systems as described in paragraph 5.3. Analysis of this
data yields an accuracy figure for each flight phase. The 6D simulator
was thus the reference against which the flight program _mplementation
was checked since the accuracy of the _,I) is well established. The follow-
ing paragraphs discuss the applicable , _ simulator's program areas used
for orbital navigation • erif_cation.
q. 4. 1 Inte,.,ration
: Integration of the equations of motion w_t} n the 6D proeram was accomp-
lished at the end of each flight proel .:_ :_,_nc.rloop resultine in navig, alion
parameter update approx:' ,tely every i00 milliseconds in the orbital
fli_hl phase.. The digital integration is ;, forward trapezoidal scheme.
Use of this ,nte,zratlon rate provlde, s an accurate reference for compari-
son to the flieht program scheme of na" i,_,ation param,qer update exerv
eieht seconds utilizing, a midpoint predl_t_,c _n a modified Scarborough
technique.
5.4.2 Acceleration Models
The mathematical models used to compensate for the effects of graxity and
drag accelerations on the vehicle are identical in both the 6r) .,nd flight pro-
grams for orbital simulation periods. Slncc the ol) mendel ll'Jll)l,,mentall,_ns
t
have been pr_., en, only the input data needed further lnx estlgation.
5.4.2. 1 Gravitational Acceleration Mc,del
The equ,ttlons fur the ; ravitation acceleration nlodt, i requlrt, vehicle posi-
tion components as inputs. Since thest' values are computed by the _,D -tm-
ulation, no further \,erificatlc,n was required.
5.4.2.2 Drag Actel,'ration IVlodel
The equations for lhe drag acceleration model use Input l_ar/tn_etvrs ¢ om-
puted within *he simulat_r. No , er_fication eff(_rl was required _n th_s .,rea.
=,-2
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_. 4. 3 Na\ ivation ITl)ctale
At the specified na\i_:alLon update t_ne, T0dNI:I_rFIx_, of e-.ery accept_'d
DCS con_rnancl, leo established processln,, sequence was corr,:ctiy per-
formed. S'dbsequcntly, the (zu_ctance passes and the na,,J_atlon passes
were scheduled at one and eig, ht ._ec(,nd intervals, respectively, after
the spec:fied na,,iaation update execution time. Verification of the navi-
gation update capability is also discussed in Section 10.
a.4.4 Delta V Monitorln_
An accelerometer error input to the (,D/LVDC simulator was used to
cause the desired acceleration lobe read each time the accelerometers
are read ill Time Base 4 and Time Base 5. The trace capability of the
(,D/LVDC simulator was used to verify that the accelerometer ctata was
processed correctly.
5.4.4. 1 Delta \r Monitc)rin,, Durin_ Time B_se- 4
Durin,- Phase II initialization, the measured elrwity components ;,re _et
to Zel'O ;tn(1 the accelk, rOlTlk, tt:rb are read. The accelcrc)mcters are r(',d
each second thereafter and the chance in the measured ,elc,city is accu--
rnulated in the storage It)cations designated Ir)r the l??e.:tStll't'd elocity
components. The velocity components are telenaetcred each t_nae the
accumulalicms are made. The velocity _s accurl?ulaled frmn lhe "A"
channel only for each of the three acc_.lcronlcl_:r._. .No disa,.t, re,'menl,
zero, nor reasonableness testinfi was tmrformed on lht' ac(clcroln(,tor
data and tltc data was not used for na. ieatlon dur_n,2 this tit?it, period.
5.4.4.2 Della V Monitoring., Durln,: "l'_me T_,ase =,
At T-+0. 0, the measured xeloc:ty componenls art- resot Io zero and lh,.
accelerometers are read. The accelerozne_,ers are not read a_a_n until
T_31 0 seconds, t)ut art, read e'.t'r, I second thor{.allt, r l),.lla V _l{)n_
torm,.:, process_ntt _n "l':nae :_,as<.' q _n_ludes all the pro¢ eSbll]l_ ¢'1013t" 'n
T_me ';ase 4. II T,Inc 'ast: r_ has ._tartcd, a Ic._t is n_ade on I)}'.t_\" "'I,.
If I)FLVR is zero, no further action _s tak_.n on that pass; t)ut _f I)ITI.kI1
_s non-zero, the total (han_e i> m,'asur_'d ,elo_ty _s calculat,.,t by tal.-
ing the square root of the sum of *_.c squares of the elocity ( on-_ponents.
When the total chan-e in the measured \elocity eco_nes _:rcater thp" or
equal to I)I£I_VR, the safin_ sequence is initiated. I)t-21,VR is set : -o
whon the safin2 s('quence is sta.rted, re_arctl_.ss of the condition tu_dcr
which the safin,_, sequence is star*vd.
Delta V Monilorin: wa:s veril'it.d i_. , on.im, ction with the S-IV :_/I!J l)t,-
or,,it !)CS Command, St.ttion 10.-1. 13.
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5. 5 OR BITA L GUII)ANCt "2
, Vehicle altitude control durin,2 orbital flight period was verified using, tlw
outputs of the (,!_/l,Vl%C simulator. Attitude computation rate verification
is covered in paragraph 5.2. F.ach of the four basic maneu\er types was
: thoroughly exercised indi,,idually and a series of maneu\.er combinations
executed to test for possible undesirable interaction. 1-_repro-,ramn_ed
maneuvers were checked for correct initiation an.'] termination in each
nominal simulation. Nominal cases were designed to include all the
programmed maneuvers defined for the mission. Perturbations to the
nominal attitude timeline were desi,.,ne:t to test all realistic maneuxer
combinations of prepro_rammed, DCS, and spacecraft initiated vehich'
attitudes. Mode Code indications and _uidance commands were monitored
in each simulation to verify correct implementation. The followin,., para-
graphs describe the verification requirements applicable to each maneu,.er
type. In all cases, the computed xehicle attitude derived from the platform
gimbal an_les was checked to ensure that vehicle control was within the
control system (APS) deadband. Time Base 5 was started during each
_ossible maneuver type to \erify that maneu\er in proga "s is maintained
when the new time base is initiated.
5.5. I X-Freeze Maneuxer
Proper command holding of the last computed value durinj., each X-freeze
maneuver was verified through analysis of the chi components printed for
each pass of the ()D/LVDC simul,,tor.
5.5.2 Inertial Attitude ttold Maneuver
Verification of the inertial hold maneuxer consisttd of ensuring th;Lt the
specified angles in the platform coordinate system replaced the X commands
upon maneuver initiation and that the commands were held constant m_til
the next maneuver. Gimbal angle rate of chan_e an'! attitude response
time were also analyzed.
5.%. 3 Track I,ocal Reference Maneuver
The guidance commands computed for each track local reference maneu er
were verified usinu an independent computer proRram. This guidanc,,, check
program uses flight proeram computed naxiRation and uuidance paramt,t,,rs
to calculate and print the vehich' attitude offset from a plane parallel with
the local horizontal, l'ossible attitude computation errors are easily
detected using this pro=,ram.
_.5.-t Inertial Itold of I,oc.tl Refl'r_'nte .Maneu',er
The track local reference cuidance check prouram was used to terity that
tl'e flight proeram correctly computed the _uidance commands at ,naneu,,.r
initiation. FTnsurin_ , that these euidame commands are ht, hl constant for
the duration of the maneuver verifies tlat the maneuxer is impl,.n_l,nt,.d
properly.
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5.5.5 Control Switcho_er ('apahilitv
Simulations were made across TB4 with I-)[9 on to cn._ure that the tlizht pro-
gram logic checks for th,' spac,,cratI (S/(') control indi_,xtion as a ftmetion
of the "S/C Control of Saturn I.'nat,le" switch selector coml_.,and. Interaction
of the S/C control capability with other orbital maneuxers was tested throuch
a series of (,D/LVDC simulations. S/C col,trol was taken ;tnd returned acrob._
and durinp e.ach maneuver in the nominal attitude timeline. })erturbed maneu-
ver combinations are also tested for all realistic configurations. S/C control
was also taken and returned after an Execute Gez_eralized Mant.u\er DCS com-
mand was received but before implementation. All combinations of settinz
and resetting,. I)I9 with the -rious maneuxers possible with the Execute (3t'n-
eralized Maneuxer I)CS corn.hand were verified, t"li/b.t protzran-, response
was correct for each combination of _naneuver and DI') ;,,ndition.
Correct attitude calculations upon vehicle return of control to the II' were
verified in each case using the _uidance parameters teh'metered in con:trac-
tion with independent calculations. Mode Code 27 indicator bit implementa-
tion was checked.
q. 5,(, Guidance Reference t.'r_ilure ((;Rt,')
Attitude command modifications as a function of (_I_I." detection and S/(" ton-
trol (Dlq) was \erified in a test series desium,d to (he_k procram perfor-
mance in each time I_ase and flicht mode. Assurance that the ladder (.on_-
mands are frozen upon detection of (?RI." and zero_.d wh,.n I)I q is d_.tt.(tct]
was obtained 1)y a prouram tract, of the logic. Att(.mpts to t h;tn-c tht, lad-
der commands was acc(_mplished by issuance of I)CS navi_:ation updates
with suitable parameters.
5. _.7 DCS Comma_,ded tunctions
Verification of the DCS commands tapal_le of altcrin!, the nominal attitt,,te
timeline is described in Section 10.
_.5.8 Variat_le I)ata F__ape .Mant,u ,ers
The start times for maneuvers 4, :,, _,, and 7 and th,. attitudes w_th re-p,'ct
to local h(}rizontal and the desired roll anzle for m;tncu, ors 4 and ,, are
obtained properly from the loc;_tions dt.fim.d for tht.se parameters on tht.
variable data tape. The snap and tr;tcc capability of the ,,I)/I,VI)C simul,t-
for was userl to erify that the data was obt,tincd from thc arial_h: data
tape locations an:l ir"_plem_'nted co,'rcctly in the orbital ?ui,tancc calcul;_tionb.
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[ The flight prov, ram correctly determines the launch _chi¢'le po,_ition wit}_
F
respect to the earth orienled telemetry receixine stations. Simul-_lions
of four re,,olutions were made at the nominal launch azimuth.
5. t,. 1 Acquisition and J,oss Calculations
The acquisition and loss calculations correctly determine whether or not
the vehicle is in range of a telemetry station. These calculations were
verified by comparing the telemetered acquisition and loss times auainst
the results of an independent program.
5.6. Z Acquisition and I,oss Sequence
The ;_lternate switch selector sequences required tor the mission were
ahuwn to be correctly commanded throu_!h analysis of tt,1.-metry data oU-
tained from the simulations.
1975025041-032
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SECTION 6
There is no requirement for Section 6. This section is included to be con_-
patible with the Saturn IB EDD.
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oECTION 7
TIMt?, BASI';S, DISCRT:;TES, AND II_ITI':RI{UDTS
7. 1 INTRODUCTION
This section discusses the effort performed to assure proper flight program
handling of time bases, discretes, and interrupts,
7. g TIME BASES
Time bases are used to conveniently reference flight program events to some
key mission event. Proper initiation of all time bases by recognition of th,,
primary signal as well as the backup signal was verified as outlin,.d in th,.
following paragraphs. As an assurance that time bases are initiated only
within the correct time frames, each primary and backup signal was forc,.d
prior to the time base enable time and forc,.d again just after th,. tim,. base
initiation tim(.. Each time base initiation time was verifi(.d by ct_,.cl:ing that
TI was updated to within 2 ms of the ti:n,, that the flight progran_ r,.co,aniz,.d
the requirc.d signal(s} for starting th,. tim,. bas_..
7. 2.1 Time Base 0 (Guidance Rvferf.ncc Release}
1
TB0 is correctly i_,.itiatvd by the GRI{ interrupt (INT7) from the. la,lnch
sequencer. Verification of the proper initiation of TB0 was acccm_plishvd
by sequencir.g the flight program through the prefli,;ht routin,.s and checkin;,
that, in response to IN'F7, the time in the time base ('FB) and thv time of
time base initialization from GRR (TI) were initializvd corrt.ctly, that th,.
correct mode code bit was set and that phase I initialization was perforn_,.d
as specified in the I':vent Sequence Timelin_: table and the t)rec_.ttinL: tatar..
7. 2.2 Time Base 1 (I,iftof.,
TB1 is used for st.quencing durinv: S-Ill stage until detection of the S-It_
low h.'vel sensors dry interrupt.
TB1 is initiated properly by rec_.ipt of either liftoff discrvtv (DI7 or DI2-1}.
Failure to liftoff (by i,xhibitin_: I_17 and DI2-I) was s,'quenced to verify corr,.ct
program action at T0+150.
Correct monitoring of 1/17 and DL24 was vvrifie,l by s,.ttine ,.ach ind,.pvn,t,.ntly
and togt.th,.r prior to ti_e eraabh, time and utilizin_ a prot_ram trac,, to ¢le1_,or'-
strate that vach is eh,.ckvd prop¢.rly from ',he ..nable tivn_ ,tutil "I't_1. |_ropq. r
initiation of'l't_l was verifivd b_ demonstrating that TI_ and TI arv eorr,.ctlv
updat¢.d, that the proper mude eo_l,: bit is set and that 'L't_l ,.v,.nts ar,. ex,.c,t_v,l
as specified in thv I';vent S_'quvnce Tim_.line tabh..
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7.2.3 Time Ba_e 2 (S-II_ I.ov.' l.ev,,1 S_.nsors Dry)
[ TB2 is used for scqut, ncing from S-IB low level sensors dry until S-IB
I
outboard engine cutoff. The signals for initiating lhis tirol, I)as_, are _hP
S-IB low level sensors dry "A" interrupt (INT2) and th{, 5-ii_ low levvl
sensors dr,., "B" interrupt (INT6}. Corr_.ct initiation of Tt',2 was verified
by checking the program's response to INT2 and INTL. Each interrupt
was inhibited to verify correct initiation of the tirol' base by receipt of th{.
other signal. Both INT2 and INT6 were set prior to TB2 enable to w.rify
that TB2 is enabled properly.
Verification of the downrange w.locity constraint was accomplished by
forcing the downrange velocity to be less than 500 m/s and checking that
TB2 was not started and the program set the ladder outputs to z_.ro and
entered a one-instruction loop. Correct bypassing of the w, locity con-
straint was verified by starting TB1 witbmlt actually liftin_ off, forcing
GRF, and demonstrating that TB2 wa,_ pr,.t,crly initiated.
7.2.4 Time Base 3 ¢S-TB Outboard t(n<inPs C_,loff}
TB3 is used for sequencing (luring S-IVl_ sta_{. 'l'h{. primary signal for
initiating the time base is the S-II'_ outLoard _.n;,in(.s cutoff "A" int{'rrul}t tINTS)
and the backup signal is the S-II_ outboa."d ex;_ines cutoff "I_" discret(.
(DI23).
Correct initiation of TB3 by th{' primary s,_nal was verified by checkinI_ th(.
progranPs response to INT5. INT5 was inhibited to verify correct initiat, "'
of the time base by receipt of DI23. Both INT5 and I)I23 were set prior to
'FB3 enable to verify that TB3 was enabled properly. Also, both INT5 an(i
DI23 were inhibited. "FB3 was properly initiated on the time backup at the
correct time by the fligkt program.
7.2.5 Time Base 4 (:;-IVB Cutoff)_
Time Base 4 (TB4) is used for seoue::cing alter S-IVB cutoff. There are fc}ur
indications which are checked to start TI_4; the detection of any two of which
will initiate the time base. These f{,ur indications are list,.{l b{,low:
• S-IVB Engine Out "A" (DIS)
• S-IVB Engine Out "B" (INT4)
• S-IVB Cutoff switch selector issued by tl,r LVI)C
• Velocity c},,tnve of les_ than 1 m/s nwa,_,lr{.{l t.y tE_"
i,aertial pl,ttform over last boost n_ajor loop
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Verification of the proper ini[iatlon of TB4 was accomplished by forcing
inhibits on all combinations of these four conditions and checking that, in
response to at least two of the conditions being present prior to TB4
enable, the mode code bit TB and TI
proper \vas set, _,ere correctly up-
dated and the TB4 events were executed as specified in the Event Sequence
Timeline table. Single indlcations were forced to verify that initiation
of TB4 requires two S-IVB catoff indications.
7.Z.6 Time Ease 5 (S-IVB/IU De-orbit DCS Command 1
Time Base 5 is used for sequencing of LOX and LH Z dump, and a vehicle safing
sequence. Time Base 5 must start at T4+60TDss, where TDS S is specified by
a DCS con_rnand. To prevent premature starting of TB5, itmust be inhibited
until T4+T5GR D.
Proper initiationof TB5 was checked by issuing TDS S to start TB5 prior to and
after TB5 is enabled. In the former case, the DCS cor_mand was rejected by
the flight program, and a DCS error code issued. In the latter case, proper
response was verified by observing that bit 7 of Mode Code Z7 was reset after
being set by the DCS command. DCS time updates were also issued to ensure
that they did not affect the Time Base 5 start time.
7.3 DISCRETE OUTPUTS
Discrete outputs are directly dependent upon the flight program and are used to
affect external equipment. Of the thirteen bit positions in the discrete output
register, only five are used in flight. The proper setting of these discrete
outputs was verified as discussed below.
; 7.3.1 DO1: Reset Command Decoder
, This discrete output is an indication to the command decoder that a DCS word
has bee,_ read and found to be valid by the flight program. Issuance of this DO
provides a computer reset pulse (CRP) that resets the command decoder. The
correct setting of DO1 was verified by demonstrating that, in response to a
valid DCS word, the DO is set to a logic I. Invalid DCS commands were issued
to verify DO1 remains a logic 0 in response to rejected commands.
7.3.2 DO4 and DO6: Guidance Reference Failure
DO4 and DO6 are redundant indications of guidance reference failure (GRF).
Verification of the proper setting of these discrete outputs was accomplished
by demonstrating that DO4 and DO6 are set to a logic 1 in response to a GRF.
7.3.3 DOI2: I_Vr)A/LVDC Firing Comnuit Enable
The flight program sets this discrete output to signify a ready-to-launch condi-
tion after receipt of GRR. The correct setting of DO12 was verified by demon-
strafing that the DO is set upon completion of normal flight program initializa-
tion and is reset at TI+0.
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7. 3.4 DO13" LVDA/LVDC Firinl_ Commit Inhibit
This discrete output is interlocked with the launch sequencer such that its
receipt forces a countdown recycle before launch is possibl_. DOI3 is
set by hardv,_re, not by the flight program.
7.4 DISCRETE INPUTS
Discrete inputs are hardware dependent signals originating outside the flight
program which control flight sequencing fuimtions by affecting program flow.
The flight program's response to each signal was _'erifiedas outlined in the
following paragraphs.
As an assurance that the discretes are honored only in the proper time frames,
each discrete was forced in the following inter_ais:
• Before the discrete is enabled
After the discrete has been detected
• After the discrete has been disabled
The correct sampling rate of the discrete input register (DIR) was verified uti-
lizing the selective print capability of the 6D/LVDC simulator.
7.4.1 DII: RCA-IIOA Sync
DII is used only in the ground routines and there is no requirement for the flight
program to monitor this discrete. Verification that Dll is never monitored was
accomplished by activating DII during several phases of the mission and check-
ing that no program reaction results.
7.4.2 DIZ: Command Decoder OM/D "A" and Command Decoder OM/D "1%"
This discrete correctly indicates to the LVDC whether a DCS co:r,mand is a mode
or data command. Th, corr_ct progra:n response to this discrete was v(_rificd
by issuing a DCS command and demonstrating that the program sets up for a
mode command in response to DI2 being a logic l and sets up for a data cormuand
in response to DI2 being a logic 0.
7.4.3 DI3: Spare
DI3 is a spare and was not monitored by the flight program. Verification was
accomplished by forcing the discrete during several parts of the mission and
checking that no program reaction oc_'urred.
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7.4.4 DI4: Spare
Verification was the same as for DI3.
7.4.5 Di5: S-IVB Engine Out "A"
DI5 indicates that the S-IVB engine is out and is one of the conditions which ini-
tiates TB4. The correct program response to this discrete was verified by
forcing the discrete and utilizing a program trace to demonstrate that the
presence of DI5 is noted as one of the conditions for starting TB4. DI5 and
each other condition for starting the time base were forced to verify all logic
paths.
7.4.6 _,,L
_u: Spar.e
Verification was the same as for DI3
7.4.7 DI7: Liftoff"B"
This discrete indicates that liftoff has occurred. The proper program response
to DI7 was verified by demonstrating that TB1 is initiated by recognition of
this discrete. A program trace was used to verify that DI7 is detected within
the specified time.
7.4.8 DI8: Spare
Verification was the same as for DI3.
7.4.9 DI9: S/C Control of Saturn
This discrete is a signal from the spacecraft to indicate to the LVDC that the
spacecraft has taken control of the flight control computer (FCC) and that the
LVDC outputs to the FCC are not being accepted. Correct program response
to the presence of this discrete was verified by forcing DI9 and demonstrating
that the proper mode code bits are set and that the ladder outputs are zeroed
by maintaining the _<'s and minor loop _('s equal to the gimbal angles and by
setting the minor loopX rates to zero. The correct interrogation of this dis-
crete by the flight program was verified by using a program block trace to
demonstrate that DI9 is monitored once per BML from T4+5.0 seconds to
orbit initialization and once per second from then until T5+0. Verification
of the detection of DI9 in combination with a GRF is discussed in paragraph
5.5.6.
Verification of the correct program response to the deactivation of DI9 is dis-
cussed in paragraph 5.5.5.
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7.4.10 DII0: Coolant Thermal Switch #i
DI10 at_d Dill indicate that the temperature of the environmental control system
(ECS) coolant is above the selected control temperature. The verification of
the correct program response to these discretes was accomplished by settiLg
and resetting combinations of DI10 and Dill at various times during the flight
and checking that the proper switch selectors are issued.
The correct sampling rate of DI10 and Dill was verified by demonstrating that
these discretes are checked every 300 seconds beginning at T0+TM seconds.
Correct inhibiting of the water control valve logic was verified by demonstrating
that DI10 and DIll are permanently ignored by the flight program following the
Water Control Valve Logic Inhibit DCS command and that bit 18 of MCZ7 is
reset.
7.4.11 DI11: Coolant Thermal Switch #2
See DII 0.
7.4.12 DIIZ: S-IB/S-IVB Separation
This discrete indicates that the S-IB and S-IVB stages have separated. There
is no requirement for the flight program to monitor this discrete. Verification
that DIIZ is never monitored was accomplished by checking that no program
reaction results when DIiZ is reset.
7.4.13 DII3: Spare
Verification was the same as for DI3.
7.4.14 DII4: S-IB Outboard Engine Out
This discrete indicates that at least one S-IB outboard engine is out. Correct
adjustments based on the detection of DII4 in TBI were verUied by forcing an
S-IB outboard engine failure and checking that the tir,e tiltcalculations were
properly modified, that the backup acceleration, (F/M)c, was correctly ad-
justed, that the correct mode code bits were set and that SIN(6") was substi-
tuted for SIN(Z") in the zero test computation. Correct adjustments based on
the detection of DI14 in TBZ were verified by forcing an S-IB outboard engine
failure and checking that SIN(6 °) was substituted for SIN(Z") in the zero test
computation, and that the proper mode code bits were set. Verification that
erroneous indications of an S-IB outboard engine failure are handled properly
was accomplished by demonstrating that, in response to forcing DI14 without
an engine failure, the discrete is detected the same as for a valid S-IB out-
board engine failure. A program block trace was utilized to verify that this
discrete is checked oncc per BML, until detection, during the time intcrval
from TI+Ts1E0 seconds until TB3.
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7.4.15 DI15: S-II_ Inboard Engine Out "B"
DI15 indicates that at least one of the S-IB inboard r-ngines is out. Correct
program adjustments based on the detection of this discrete in TL1 were veri-
fied by forcing an S-IB inboard engine failure and checking that the time tilt
calculations were properly modified, that the backup acceleration, (F/M) c,
was correctly adjusted, that tb_ co:rect mode code bits were set and that
SIN(6 °)was substituted for SII_(2 °) in the zero test computation. Correct
adjustments based on the detection of DI15 in TB2 were verified by forcing
an S-IB inboard engine failure and checking that SIN(6 °) was not substituted
for SIN(Z °) in the zero test computation, and that the proper mode code }0its
were set.
Verification that erroneous indications of an S-IB inboard engine failure are
handled properly was accomplished by demonstrating that in response to forc-
ing DI15 without an engine failure, the discrete was detected the same as for
a valid S-IB inboard engine failure. A program block trace was utilized to
verify that this discrete is checked once per BML, until detection, during the
time interval from TI+Ts1E0 seconds until TI33.
7.4.16 DI16: Prepare for Guidance Reference Release
DI16 is used only by the ground routines and there is no requirement for the
flight program to monitor this discrete. Verification that DI16 is never moni-
tored was accomplished by checking that no program reaction results from
Dil6 being activated.
7.4.17 DI17: Spare
Verification was the same as fo:" DI3.
7.4.18 DI18: Spare
Verification was the same as for DI3.
?.4.19 DI19: Spare
Verification was the same as for DI3.
7,4,20 DIg0: Spacecraft Initiation of S-IVB Engine Cutoff
There is currently no requirement to check DI20, Verification of program re-
sponse _o DIg0 was the same as for DI3.
%
7.4.21 DI21: Spa re
Verification was the same as for DI3.
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I 7.4.22 DIZ2: Spare
Verification was the same as for DI3.
7.4.23 DI23: S-IB Outboar d Engines Cutoff "B"
DI23 is the backup signal for starting TI33. The correct program response to
this discrete was vcrilied by forcing the discrete and using a program trace
to demonstrate that DIg3 will start TB3 properly.
7.4.24 DI24: Liftoff "A"
This discrete indicates that liftoff has occurred. The proper program response
to DI24 was verified by demonstrating that TB1 is initiated by recognition of
this discrete. A program trace was used to verify that DI24 is detected within
the specified time.
7.4.25 DIS1-DIS8: Spares
Verification',vaa the =ame as fr_r DI3.
7.5 INTERRUPTS
The LVDC hat a feature which permits interruption of the normal program
to free the computer for priority tasks. When such a priority task arises,
an interrupt is generated. This transfers control to a special routine upon
the completion of the instruction then being executed.
Of the twelve interrupts, nine are external and three are provided for
functions internal to the LVDC. The correct program response to each
interrupt was verified as discussed in the following paragraphs.
As an assurance that an interrupt is honored only in the proper time frames,
each interrupt was forced during the following intervals:
• Prior to the specified enable time
• After the interrupt has been honored
• After the interrupt has been disabled
7.5,1 INTI: Command LVDA/RCA-110A Interrupt
This signal is u-ed in the preflight routines and there is no requirement to pro-
cess it by the flight program. Verification that this interrupt is not processed
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was accomplished by activating the interrupt during several parts of the nlission
and checking that no program reaction results.
7.5. g INT2: S-IB Low Level Sensors_pry_ "A'____'
This interrupt indicates that the propellant level in either the S-IB fuel tanks
or LOX tanks has dropped below a given level. The initiation of TB2 in re-
sponse to the activation of INT2 verified correct flight program response to
this interrupt.
7.5.3 INT3: RCA-IIOA ";nterrupt
See discussion for INTl.
7. 5.4 INT4: S-IVB Engine Out "B"
INT4 indicates that the S-IVB engine is out and is one of the conditions which
initiates TB4. The correct program response to this interrupt was verified
by forcing the interrupt and utilizing a program trace to demonstrate tlmt the
presence _,f INT4 is noted as one of the conditions for starting TB4. INT4
and each other condition for starting TB4 were forced to verify all logic paths.
7.5.5 INT5: S-IB Outboard Engines Cutoff "A"
This interrupt indicates that the propellant in the S-IB fuel tanks has depletcd
and is the primary signal for initiating TB3. The correct program response
to INT5 was verPied by demonstrating that TB3 is initiated by detection of
this interrupt.
7.5.6 INT6: S-IB Low Level Sensors Dry "B"
Verification was the same as for LNT2.
7. 5.7 INT7: Guidance Reference Rolease {GRR}
This interrupt is initiated by the launch sequencer and indicates that the sta-
bilized platform has been released. Correct processing of this interrupt was
verified during the preflight prepare to launch (PTL) mode by denmnstratin_
that TB0 is started by detection of this interrupt.
7.5.8 INT8A and INTSB: Command l)ecoder Interrupt:: "A" _n,'t "B"
This interrupt tndicatos to the I.VDC that a DCS comn_and has been roceived b v
the command dec_,,ler. The correct response with respect t_ INT8 w.s verified
by demonstrating that the program sets up to proc,,ss a IICS co, remand wJ,en
this interrupt is activated.
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7.5.9 INT9: TLC-Simultaneous Memory Errori
This interrupt indicates either a Inelnory parity error or a men_ory drive c_:r-
rent check failure. Correct program response to LNT9 was verified by forcing
the interrupt at various mission tinges to test for execution of the spucified
recovery modes. In each case, correct telemetry coding was verified, proper
DOR & ICR reset checked and EMR accumulation ensured through analysis ef
6D/LVDC program execution traces of the TLC module.
7.5.10 INTI0: Spare
INTI0 is a spare and there is no requirement for the flight program to process
this interrupt. Verification that the program does not react to this interrupt
was accomplished by forcing INTIO and checking that no program response
occurs.
7.5.11 INTII and INTI2: Internal Function of the LVDC
These two interrupts are provided to the LVI)C for functior:s internal to the
computer. INT12 is referred to as the Timer 1 interrupt and is used to c_n-
trol the execution of priority modules which require operation at an exact
time or at a precisely cyclic rate. INTll is referred t9 as the Timer Z
interrupt and is used to control the execution of priority modules of a lower
order than those under Timer 1 but which also require operation at a specific
time or rate as precisely as possible.
The correct program response to INTll and INT12 was verified indirectly b_
verification of the functions which they control; namely, for INT12, minter
loop, switch selector processing, and liftoff search; and, for LNTll, Phase
I and II time update, events processor, time tilt guidance, and Phase II
control.
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LAUNCH VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONTROL
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The flight program maintains correct vehicle attitude control via the minor
loop and minor !oop support modules by generating vehicle attitude error
signals. This section describes the verification of the minor loop and minor
loop support modules of the flight program. Logic was checked during boost
and orbit (unusual timing situations necessitate the additional orbit checks)
and the constants used by these modules checked at every point during the
flight. Since the same logic instructions are used throughout the flight wtth
only the constants changing, verification of the logic at two points and the
constants at all points verified the logic threughout the flight.
8.2 MINOR LOOP
The minor loop properly _ c,; platform gimbal angle data, evaluatcs t}li_
Jata, and c_mputes and :_,._ues attitude error commands. V,erificatior, was
accol,:p!ish,-d by exercising the various logic paths and checking the. 1;.n,its,
constants, and execution timing.
8.2.1 Gimbal Am_zle Data
The fine girt.hal angle _es_lvt, r "s iuit;,ally selected in each a,_is. Backup re-
solvers are properly seitcteJ "n each axis when fine gimbal ¢ailures are
forced as described in the tollowing paragraphs. Tile gimba] reading bit
pattern was correct in all cases.
Verification of re_'qver reading initialization for both fine and backup con-
figuration is discussed in paragraph 3.2.2.
8.2.2 Gimbal Data Processing
The gimbal resolver readings correctly undergo several validity tests before
they are used to compute vehicle attitude and attitude error commands. "Fhe
following paragraphs describe the verification of the logic used to detect
erroneous gimbal angle readings.
8.2.2.1 Disagreement Bit Processing
The counters are correctly determined to be in disagr_,ement whenever the
A and B readings disagree by more than 43 or less than -4 bits. Verification
runs were made with the following confl_inations of differences between the
A and B counter readings and the state of the disagreen_ent bit (DGB):
(a) Positive and negative differences just w itl_in tolerance and the
DGB on,
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(b) Zero difference with the DGI' on,
(c) Positive and negative differences just out of tolerance witt_
the DGt3 off, and
(d) Positive and negative differences just out of tolerance with
the DGB on.
The flight program properly determines the valid and invalid disagreement
bit and keeps account of the disagreement bit circuitry failures.
After a valid disagreement Ead been detected, the counters were perturbed
by simulating in and out of tolerance counter readings when the flight prep-
gram addressed the counters for incrementation at a known frequency. The
following combinations were used to verify the program's capability of de-
tecting and compensating for counter malfunctions.
(a) A and B c_,mters within tolerance.
(b) A and I; counters out of tolerance.
(c) A counter within and B counter out of tolerance.
(d) B counter within and A counter out of tolerance.
The proper co'rotor readin_ is selected for rea._,,nableness testing in each
case and the program keeps account of the nun_ber of counter failures. Tv,'¢,
failures of either counter in the specified time results i,_ the dis,_gree_nent
bit processing being permanently bypassed and tl_e other co,rater selectt,d.
Failure of both counters twice in the specified time results in the _zuid,tn<e
reference failure discretes being set.
When a valid disagreement is detected and both counter._ art. within tolerance,
the flight progra n selects tile A counter reading for re.tswnabl,'ness tt'st_..
If the A counter reading is found reasonable, a B multiplexer failure ss
assumed and the B multiplexor failure tount_.r is incremented. If the A
counter reading is found unreasonable, all A multiplexer failure is assul_,.d
and the A multiplexer failur," counter is incremented. If the A multipl,.xvr
is in error twice or the t_ nmltiplexer is in ,'rror fiv,. times in the specifi_'d
time, disagreement bit l)rcJcossing is pc'r_anently byt).ts:,ed and the c(,untvr
corresponding to the other multiplexer is pervnanently selected f(_r reas,,n-
ableness testing.
All program logic was nllplottlented prop_'rly and all mode code bits w_.re s, t
correctly.
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8. Z.2.2 Reasonableness Tests
Both reasonableness tests, unreasonable zero and unreasonable change are
perforlned properly on the selected gimbal angle r,.ading_, Verification was
accomplished as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Readings were simulated that forced the attitnde error signals to values less
than, equal to, and greato,- than (in both positive and negative direction.-_') t}_e
zero test constant in each axis. The program pro,_erly selects the reason-
able readings to update the vehicle attitude angle and rejects the unreason--
able readings.
Gimbal angle readings were forced on both sides of the resolver reasonable-
ness test constant. The resolver overflow test was also exercised in the
same manner. The program properly determines the reasonable and un-
reasonable read mgs.
P, easonableness test verification was acconaplished for both fine and backup
resolw, rs in each axis. The counters that keep track of tim error rates
are increme:,ted and reset properly.
8.2.2.3 Minor Loop Error Telenmtry
The minor loop error word Is telemetered in the correct format and at th,.
appropriate time in all cases. Verification was accomplished by obtaining
a printout of the n_inor lrmp telemetry word in each of the minor loop w. rt-
fication eases.
8.2.3 Attitude ICrr(,r Comn_ands
The equations used to compute the n_inor loop attitude comnmnds are imple-
mented properly. Verification was accomplis!:ed by t_sina independent cal-
cuiations for each axis. Iqxtreme desired vehicle attitude._ xw.r- forced,
[)tit the attitude con_rnand ma_4nitude and rate were li,nit,'d propc, rly.
The error m(_nitor register indication ,_f circuitry failnr,, was forced to,
verify the selection of the proper ladder channel. The channels were s,'lec-
ted properly and the counter that k,.eps track of circuitry failures was incre-
mented and reset properly.
8.3 MINOR LOOP SUPPOI/T
The minor loop supw,rt functions prop,.rly c_t', 'rote attitude change incretz_ents
and the coefficients for the v,it:_b,_l-to-b_dy transf_rm,tti,_i_ to be ':._-d In t!_t.
minor l_ol.,. Verification of the n,in(_r lo_,p sup[,,rt functi_,ns ib describ,.d
below.
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I 8.3.1 Attitude Increments
The desired attitude cent,hands are computed properly each minor loop I_y
adding the fixed mcrem,.nts to the previous attitude con_x_and value_. (:,,,,,-
putation of the attitude incre nents for use by the minor loop module was
checked for each platform axis with independent equation solutions. Proper
attitude change magnitude limiting was verified through analysis of the minor
loop and minor loop support telemetry when larg_, desired attitude c(,Inman(]s
were given. Correct bypassing of the steering misalignment correcti' ::
(SMC) terms during iterative guidance mode (IGM) of flight v, as verified by
performance cases containing perturbations which cau:_ed the attitude con_-
mand increments to exceed the magnitude limits
8.3.2 Gimbal-to-Body Transformation
The calculations required to obtain the predicted roll and yaw aw. rage atti-
tude angles for compensation of the changing relationship be_veen the vehicle
body and the inertial platform were executed properly. Verification was
acconlplished through independ(.nt soldtions Of the equati¢_ns.
The special logic required for average roll attitud,- angle determination was
executed properly. Verification was accomplished by forcing tl'_e different,.
between predicted and actual angles to values that lie on either side (_f th,'
I crossover magnitude (180 °). Coefficients nec,ded by the minor loop modul,.
for transformation of the attitude errors frc, m the ginfl,,tl coordinate systeI_
to the vehicle co¢,rdinate systt'm were calculated tndepend ,_tly ttlid ¢oIll!)ai'('d
to those values compLtted t,y the flight program.
8.3.3 Loss of APS Attitude Control Test
The X and Z attitude control tests were enabled prop,'rly and c¢,rrt.ctly de-
tected attitude errors which exceeded the specified test constants. The la,i-
der magnitude limit was set to twelve (]et4re_'S when an X or Z attitt,de c_,,_-
trol failure was determined t)r_vided the non_in,tl tl_,_ellne rltd not specif_
a larger magnitude limit f(_r an axis. Correct pri_,rity between the 1,_dd,.r
magnitude limit following an attittMe control test fatlure, I)(:S I,adder
Magnitude Linlit cotntlutnd, and nominal timeline chang,'s was ver_fit, d.
The APS attitude control test i, correctly disabled after detecti,_n of an
attitude control f,tilt_r,, ,)r aftt. r i._s,:ance of th," lie's I,ad,l, r Magnitude
Limit command.
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SWITCH SELECTOR PROCESSING
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Switch selector commands are correctly issued under program control to
provide sequencing signals to the launch vehicle hardware. This section
discusses the verification accomplished to assure proper program execu-
tion of the switch selector commands.
9.Z COMMAND EXECUTION OPERATIONS
All the separate program operations required to properly issue one switch
selector command are executed properly. Verification of the correct exe-
cution of each operation was accomplished as outlined below.
9.Z. 1 Sequence of Operation
The sequence of operation refers to the order of execution and timing require-
ments of each step necessary to activate a switch selector command. Cor-
rect execution of each step and maintenance of the minimum timing require-
ments between steps were verified through analysis of a series of 6D/LVDC
intermediate timing cases. Nominal and perturbed switch selector feedback
conditions were simu]ated to verify correct processing of all realistic
sequencing and timing combinations.
9.Z.i. 1 Hung Stage Test
The hung stage test correctly checks the address feedback to assure all inputs
are zero. The proper execution of this test was verified by forcing the ad-
dress feedback to be non-zero and checking the program's response. All
switch selectors from GRR to T4+IO0 were tested to verify that the hung
stage test was made prior to issuing commands which require a forced
reset for hung stage conditions. Sequencing from GRR to T4+I00 includes all
of the types of switch selectors which require the hung stage test.
9.2.1.2 Stage and Address
After the hung stage test, the flight program correctly issues the stage and
address. This operation was verified by comparing the issued stage and ad-
dress against the expected stage and address and also by checking that the
correct telemetry was issued.
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9.2.1.3 Address Verification
After issuance of the stage and address, the switch selector feedback is pro-
perly checked. This operation was verified by forcing feedback errors
and checking that the program executed the proper corrective action including
mode code bit setting, internal control register bit resetting, and telemetry
when required. One bit feedback error, all bit feedback error, and all zero
feedback were forced to verify all possible logic paths involved with this
operation.
9.2.1.4 Read Command
The read command correctly activates the logic on the switch selector to pro-
duce the commanded output. This operation was verified by comparing the
stage, address and associated real-time clock reading telemetry after read
command issuance with the output from the simulated oD switch selector
register.
9.2.1.5 Reset Read
The reset of the read command is correctly issued no less than Z5 ms after
the read command is issued. This operation was verified by the series of
6D/LVDC s\\'itch selector cases by checkin- that the read command for each
switch selector is not reset until the specified interval (Z5 ms) had elapsed.
9.2. Z Termination of a Command Sequence
A command which is in progress can be properly terminated by issuance of
a forced reset, Verification was accomplished by forcing the conditions
which require a forced reset (by a -FLC, a hun_ sta,.,e failure or by feedback
errors) and observing that the proper termination was con_plett, d.
9.3 TIMING
The timing requirements for all switch selector commands are properly
satisfied. Switch selector timing was verified by comparing the times of
all switch selector read commands, for the no,minal sequence and all alter-
nate sequences, with the issuance times specified by the Flight Sequencing
table. All switch se:ector con_mands were issued within the specified
tolerance.
9.4 PRIORITIES
When requirements for simultaneous issuance of switch se]ector comn_ands
occur, the commands are issued correctly with the following priority:
A. Class I alternate sequence
1. S-IVB cutoff switch selector
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B. Class II alternate sequence
None defined for this mission
C. Nominal flight sequence
D. Class IIIalternate sequence
I. Generalized switch se.lector
2. Coolant valve
E. Class IV alternate sequence
i. Telemetry station acquisition sequence
2. LOX depletion dump start sequence
3. LOX depletion dump stop and LH2
depletion dump start sequence
4. Start safing sequence
The hie.,_rchy of these swilch selector commands was verified by forcin,.,
the requirements for simultaneous switch selectors, where the possibility
exists for interference, and then checking that the corr ct priority was
followed.
There were .'o simulations made for each interaction. Tt_e first simulation
was designed such that the sequence of operations for the lower priority
switch selector would be in progress when the requirements for issuing the
higher priority switch selector were introduced. In each of these tests, the
lower priority sequence was correctly interrupted and replaced by that of
the hi_;her priority sequence. Depending upon specifications, the sequence
of operations for the lower priority switch selector would be re-entered and
the command correctly issued or the sequence of operations would be co_r-
rectly terminated. The second simulation was the sequence for the hi_her
priority switch selector in pro,._ress when the conditions for issuing the
lower priority switch selector were introduced. In these tests, the hi,abet
priority sequence would not be interrupted and the command would t_e pro-
pe. ly issued. The lower priority sequence wan then, dependin-, upon speci-
fications, either re-initiated and the command correctly issued or correctly
terminated.
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SECTION 10
DIGITAL COMMAND SYSTEM
1 0.1 INTRODUCTION
The Digital Command System (DCS) correctly provides a limited real-time
means of controlling specific flight program functions. Correct processing
of DCS com.rnand3 by the flight progran_ was verified as outlined in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
I0.Z DCS WORD FORMAT
The flight program has the capability to correctly read and process the infor-
mation stored in the command decoder register upon receipt of the ANDcd
interrupt bits. Also, correct interpretation of the ANDed orbital mode/data
bits is performed properly. Verification was accomplished each time a DCS
command was issued by checking that the command was reccgnized correctly
by the flight program.
i0.3 DCS COMMAND VERIFICATION
Upon detection of the command decoder interrupt (INT8), the flight program
correctly reads the contents of the command decoder register and makes
several tests on the DCS command before it is accepted for use. Correct
flight progran, implementation of the checks required to establish the vali-
dity of the data received from the command decoder was tested using the
methods described below. A generalized switch selector mode command
was issued after T4+0 to ensure that the command decoder discrete output
(DO!) is set and the DCS error counter is zeroed.
i0.3.1 DCS Mode Command Verification
The flight program has the capability to correctly detect DCS m_)de comInand
format errors. Verification was accomplished by performing the following
"_ DCS command verification tests. Running the perturbation in the order listed
verified that the flight program tests were performed in the correct sequence,
1. True complement test: A sequence of mode commands requiring
no data words was issued with combinations of correctly and
incorrectly coded complement bits. Proper rejection, accep-
tance and error code lO telemetry was executed.
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2. Sequence t;it test: A sequence of mode commands not requirinc
data words was issued with valid and invalid sequence tats. Cor-
rect rejection of invalici mode formats and error code 24 tele-
metry was performed.
3. Terrninate command test: Terminate commands were issued
followin_ I) a memory dump request, 2) a compressed data dump,
3) issuance of a mode command requirinu data, and 4) durin_' each
DCS time frame. Proper bypassing of the specified tests was
achieved.
4. Mode expected test: A DCS sequence containinv modes which do
and do not require data words was sent to the fliuht prouram.
Correct rejection of invalid configurations and correct error
code 20 telemetry was accomplished.
5. Memory dump or compressed data du.np in progress test: A
memory dump cop._mand and a compressed data dump command
were issued while another memory dump and compressed data
dump was iD progress. 1Crror code '.,-Itelemetry was correctly
issued.
_. Mission acceptance test: All possible DCS mode commands
(00 to 77)8 were issued in each DCS time frame to ensure that
modes not defined for the mission were correctly rejected and
error code 14 was telemetered.
7. Time acce.ptance tests: All mission defined mode commands and
associated data words were sent to tile flight pro,_,ram durin_' cac}_
DCS time frame. Correct acceptance and rejection .s a f_mction
of the tilYe frame was performed properly and error code 74
was correctly issued.
S. Pendin,, generalized switch selector test: A _eneralized switch
selector command was issued while a previously issued cent'r-
alized switch selector command was waitinc to be processed.
The first command was issued at a time to cause the uener "izcd
switch selector to e delayed !_y a nominal lat_led switch st,ieclor.
The second command was relected and error code 34 issued.
The simulator monitored the discrete output reaister to verify correct settinz
by the DCS routines. If DO1 was not set within 400 millise_ onds after the v)CS
interrupt (INTq), rejection of t},e command was assumed. Correct telcl_,l('tr,.
of DCS mode status indicators and error code words was perforn_ed properly
on all simulation runs.
0_ 10.3.2 DCS Data Coml_and Verification
When a DCS data command is recei\ed, the fli,-hl pro.,ram correctl.v perfor_'_s
several tests before the command is accepted. Verification of lhese tests was
performed in the followin;t sequence to ensure that tile llight prograI_ checks
are in the specified order.
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41. Data legal test: A generalized switch s_'le(Ior mode and th_,'c
daLa commands (only two required) were issued to .,erifythis
requirement. The last data command was correctly rejected
and error code 04 was issued.
2.. True-complement text: A _orrcctly coded mode command ,'e-
quirin,z data words was issued with various combinations of data
commands with valid and invalid complement fit confi,-urations
and correct sequence bit format. The invalid data was correctly
rejected and error code 44 was issued.
3. Sequence bit test: A valid mode word followed by data words with
correct complement bit patterns but valid and invalid sequence
bit ,alues was sent to the fli,_ht proeram. The invalid words
were correctly rejected and error code ,,0 was issued.
Telemetry requirements for DCS error messa!zes and the data status indicator
were verified in all simulation runs.
10.3. 3 DCS Data Validation
The data for some mode commands required further testin=, after being recei, ed
and formatted.
• Illegal menqory dump test: Memory dump commands requesting
data from non-existant modules and where the start module,
sector and address was greater than the end rood'ale, sector,
and address were commanded. The commands were properly
rejected and error code 50 issued. I.'urther verification of this
test is described in paragraph 10.4.4.
• Valid time test: The pro,_,ram properly rejected a Na, i2ation Update
command and an S-IVB/IU De-orbit command with imtfiementation
time of less tha;, 10 seconds in the future. A TBg slart time of
less than T%(]t_I) was properly rejected. Error code _4 was ;or-
rectly issued followin;= these rejections.
10. 3.4 DCS _rror Message
Each time the program rejects a DCS command, an error message js _orrectlv
telemetered. Error telemetry format was ,'erified in the simulations descri!,ed
above. Issuance of DCS error messages exceedint., seven consecutive failures
verified the implementation of the error counter and automatic terminate c o_r,-
mand initiation. Error Code 70 could not be _erified since no execute alternate
sequence comn_and is defined for this mission.
10.4 DCS COMMANDS
The flight program correctly accepts and processes all the I)CS comn_ands de-
fined for this mi.-sion. The foIlowine paragraphs discuss the tests used to
verify the operation of these DCS commands.
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10.4.1 Time Base Update
The time base update command correctly incre_nents or decren_ents tl_e ti_,_
in the time base by an amount specified i_y an accon:uanvirl,: DCS data co_,_:',,p,d.
I;oth positive ...nd negative v,_.lues of n_axtn,un_, ll,i:_in:un_, ,,::,'l least sic,_iflc,nt
nm!,nitudes were tested for accuracy of time t ase tin.e cban:.e. A f.,ositiw, time
base update of maximum magnitude was issued immediately after a station ac-
quisition to ensure that the calibration switch selectors were issued at maxi-
mum rate. A negative maximum update issued after T4+0 was used to verify
that switch selectors cannot be reissued. Time base updates of maximum
positive magnitude were given prior to each orbital guidance maneuver to
verify that the times for the maneuvers are not changed. It was verified
that a time base update is not accepted in TB5 and that the biased time base
time is reset at TB5+0. A time base update was issued after the last tabled
switch selector.in TB4 to verify implementation.
Multiple time base updates (both positive and negative) were issued to check
correct bias accumulation. Also, a terminate command was issued to ensure
that it had no effect upon update implementation. Bit 9 of Mode Code 27 wa:;
used to indicate correct time base update command implen_entation.
10.4.2 Navigation Update
The navigation update command correctly replaces the orbital naviRatio x stale
vector with one supplied from the ground. The accuracy of the navigati,_n
state vector component replacement was verified with a navigation update wits
an implementation time (NUPTIM) greater than 10 seconds in the future. A
navigation update with iNUPTIM less than 10 seconds in the future was issued
to verify rejection, automatic program initiated terminate, and error code 54
telemetry. Multiple navigation updates were sent to the flight program with
NUPTIM1 more than 10 seconds in the future and NUPTIM2 less titan 10 sec-
onds in the future to ensure that the second update is rejected with no effect
on the first. Multiple updates with NITt_TIM2>NUPTIM1 > 10 seconds in the
future were issued to verify that the last navigation update accepted replaces
previous updates. Mode Code 27, bit 8, was correct on each update simula-
tion run. A terminate command did not affect the navigation update. A mem-
ory dump verified proper storage of the updated parameters.
10.4.3 Generalized Switch Selector
A sequence of generalized switch selectors was issued in all DCS time frames
to check for correct nominal operatioq. Iqrror code 3,t was generated by re-
questing generalized switch selectors at maxhnurn rate during a flight perte,d
with high speed density tabled switch selectors. The flight program will not
issue a generalized switch selector command if there is less than 500 nxs
until the next preprogramnmd switch selector. Terminate commands issued
after the second data word were used to verify the no effect requir,.t_mnt ,,"
switch selector issuance. Attempts to obtain ¢.on:plement switch _'. J, _' r
were made to ensure that all commands are treated as true ,_:iress switch
selectors and bit 8 of the switch selector address is ignor, . by the pros :.am.
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The generalized switch selector is classlfied as a Clas._ illalternate sequence
and its priority was tested, where the possibility existed for interference,
with other types of switch selectors. Further discussion of switch selector
priority verification is contained in Section 9.4.
10.4.4 Memory ])ump
This DCS command correctly causes the flight program to telemeter the memory
locations specified by the accompanying data words. A memory dump command
was "issued for telemetry of a memory portion greater than 16 words (_ block).
It was verified that the first word of the block telemetered does identify the
first memory word telemetered. A memory dump command including a portion
of data requested from a non-existent module was issued to verify rejecti,m of
the command. The start module, sector and address must be less than or
equal to the end module, sector and address requested. Correct implementa-
tion of memory dump commands requesting from one to fifteen memory loca-
tions was verified. A memory dump command was issued requesting data
from an odd-numbered module to ensure that the telemetered data was from
an even-numbered module. Terminate commands were issued during all por-
tions of memory dump to verify that the terminate will stop the dunlp.
10.4. 5 Terminate
In addition to the tests hereiu outlined, a terminate was tested with respect to
all mode commands requiring data to ensure correct DCS routine resetting
before all required data words had been accepted.
10.4.6 Execute General!z,,d I'd,Lnruver
The inaplementation of both types of generalized orbital maneuvers, inertial
hold and track local reference, was verified b' isslling the appropriate DCS
mode con-mand and the 20 DCS data commands.
Commands with Tso m equal to zero and some time in the past were implen_vn-
ted within one computation cycle (after all data was received and f_rmattvd).
Commands with Tso m equal to a future time were implemented at the _,_rrvct
time.
A check was made to w, rify the correct uaage of the three refcrcnce an_:lcs,
Yref' Zref, and Xrei, by the flight program and the setting of the correct
mode code bits. A memory dump was commanded t_ verify correct st(,ra_e
of the execute generalized nu. neuver parameters.
The germralized maneuver command remams in effect until furt}_rr I)CS a¢ tlc,q
con_mands another executed generalized lllalleuv_,r or return to non_in;:l tm:,'-
line. Correct setting of MC27 })its in conjunction with this I)CS c_,n_nmr-,d
was established.
Correct interaction (;f the generalized maneuver with D19 was verifted in a test
series which included both inertial h_,ld and track local reference n_aneuvrrs.
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With the spacecraft it_ coutrol of Saturt_ 0)I9 set), at_ I';xecute I,_ertial tlo1¢I
ManeuverDCS command was accepted f,_llowed by a Returti to ,No_fit;al
Tinael_.t_e DC5 command. Upot_ the returt_ of control to the instrumeILt ut_itt
(DI9 reset) the flight program executed the pt eprogralnmed +l rack I,ocal
Reference maneuver° Subsequeutly, control was switched to the spacecraft
followed by a_, acceptable Execute Inertial Itold Maueuver_ IJpon the returt_
of co,_trol to the instrume,_t unit the flight program executed the comma, ded
Inertial IIold maneuver. An execute generalized ma,,euver comr_and was
issued before a pending execute get,cralized mat_euver a,_d a retur',_ to nonfi,,al
timeline BCS command was implemetited to verify the replacen_eut of the
pending command by the current command. A ter_ninate commar,d was issued
after the 20th valid data comma,_d was received to verify that it does not pre-
vent the execute generalized maneuver commat_d in_pleme,_tation.
A generalized maneuver command with a Tso m scheduled to occur after the
start of TB5 was issued and a memory dump commanded to verify that the
storage locations of the generalized maneuvers are zeroed at Tt_5+0.
10.4.7 Return to Norninal Tirneline
This DCS mode conmmnd provides tile capability to return to the notninal time-
line after other DCS action has been initiated to override the preprogramt_ed
orbital attitude timeline. The time to return to nominal time (TRNTI ,) is _ent
in five DCS data commands. A return to nominal titneline command was
issued with TRNTL in tile future to verify the correct storage of TRNTL, the
i zeroing of all bits in the location in which GOMTYI _ (generalized orbital n_a-
neuver type) is stored, except a 1 in bit 2, and the zeroing of n_emory loca-
tions containing the reference, angles for a pending execute generalized
maneuver. A command was issued with TRNTL equal to zero and sotne tinge
in the past to establish that the command was implemented within unc c+_m-
putation cycle (after tile data is received).
A return to notninal timeline command was issued before a pending return t<_
nominal timeline and execute ,_ener,tlized maneuver cotnnaand was inaplenmn-
ted to verify the replacing of the pending command by the current cotntnand.
After the fifth valid data comn_and was received, a terminate conm_;tnd v.'as
issued to demonstrate that it does not prevent the return t<_ n_tninal tin_e-
line comlnan¢t. The n_emory loc,ttions containing tI_e data for t}_,' return t,_
nominal timeline command are zeroed at 'I'Ba'0.
10.4.8 HCS Water C<,ntrol Valve I,c,gic Inhibit
Correct operation of this nlode comnland was verified in the t':(:S water valve
logic test defined in Secti+ms 7.4.10 and 7.-t. 11,
i0..1.9 Hxccute Maneuw-r
Tl'is I)CS c<_nmmnd will provide the capability to initiate a :_pecializt d _r_,,_tal
maneuver° This con_mand is presently not define(t; tht. ref<_re, n() veriftc,ttt,,n
was done on this comnu_n(t.
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10.4.1 0 }::,:ccu! _' .,\ltcrnate Sc,-E1S..,]c_"
Ther _. are presently no DCS alternate sequences defined. No verific,_tion was
performed on this comnmnd.
10.4.11 Targeting Load
This DCS command is used in preflight mode only; therefore, this command
will not be verified as part of flight mode verification. It was verified that
this command was not enabled during flight. Additional verification of this
command is described in paragraph 3.2.
10.4.12 Ladder Maenitude Limit
A Ladder Magnitude Limit command was i3sued with the least significant
value in t_',e data word to verify the accuracy of the implmnentation of the
command. A command with the n_aximmn possible w_lue was issued to
verify proper limiting of the command.
This command was issued followed by an attempt by the nc, minal ti:_mlim,
to change the ladder magnitude limits to values less than and greater than
those specified by the command. The pro/aram used the correct limits.
The loss of APS attitude control test was failed after giving the I.adder
Magnitude I,imit command to verify tl_at the limits art, set to I.NIL. "I'}_ts
was followed by another con_mand with lin_tt* snlaller tllan I.N'.L to verify
that the limits remain at I.ML. This portion w.:" v_rified in conju:,ction
with Section 8.3.3.
10.4.13 S-IVB/IIT I)e-orhit
The DCS S-IVB/IU De-orbit tenth,and correctly begins "I'!r;5, perforxnb t}_'
required initialization:s, and issues the specified alt,,rnate switch scl_ct_,r
sequence s.
The data conm_and_ are fornmtted c_rrectly b)' the flight pr,,qram. "I}_,. I_'._x-
imum and mininmm duration times specified by the data commands wvre veri-
fied. The atart time of I'1_5 its spectfivd ir_ t}_,' I)CS c(,llmland is prc,p_.rlv
tested to ensure that the sl2trt time is greater than T5(.RI ) and at least 10
seconds in the future. "l'i_t program properly rejects t_,' conmmnd, is._ue._
error code 54 and performs an ._utomatic pr,,t_ral_x initiated terminatc tf
either of thcse tests is failed.
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S-IVI_/IU De-orbit conalnan(ts were issued with TI,I)I):(), l)IqI,VI< (),
and TI{I)D-0. V;hen TI,DT) is zero, the I,OX and hydro:,en dumps are
bypassed and the safinu sequence is s(heduled to start at T_I()._I second:_.
When I)FL\'I_ is zero, the _clocity test is I)ypu:_._ed and the :.©X a:,d
hydro,_en dmnps were pcrformcd for the duration defined }_y I'I,I)D and
Tltl)D. When DtqLVR is non-zero, the dun_ps art. terminated ,tz_,i [l_c
safing sequence started when the total measured ,elocity becolnea equal
to or greater than DI.;I_VR. \_t_en T_.II)I) is zero, the I_OX dump is termi-
nated by scheduling the safin_ sequence to start inunediately iollowinc tt_e
LOX (lump. Commands with \arious ,,slues of TLDD, TttI)I), "Lnd I3tCI_VI¢
were issued to cause the velocity test to be satisfied during ever) possi})h'
segment of the I_OX and hydro;zen dun_ps. In exery case, the velocity test
is terminated when the safin:_, sequence is scheduled.
The four quantities from the data commands are properly scaled and stored
by the flight program. A de-orbit command, accepted before T I3G is started
in response to a previous de-orbit command, correctly replaces the t)rt'-
vious coznxx_and. The de-orbit command is not acce[ted in "I'_',_.
Mode Code 27, bit 7, is set and reset properly.
10.4. 14 Compressed ])ata Dump
This DCS command pro' ides the capability for comrnandinu a dump of the com-
pressed data tattles.
Upon acceptance of this co_nmand, the flight provram will dump the co_presb,'i
data tables three times in their entirety. The cor_?pressed data dump will ,c
stopped only },y ret eitct of a terminate command. Other II'ortt's t omP._anded
clurin.2 a dump are accepted exct:t)t a nnt.znory cttu]_p or anoth,,r c ompreb._td
data dun,p which are rejected and ( rror ¢ ode , 4 sill e issued,
Verification of the data contained in tht: cornprcsst.d data tables is (lc.bc z'i},t.(l
in Section 11. ;.2.
10.4. lq Remo,c Inhii,it on the !:2xtr;tc tion M;tneu',er
The [{enlo' c Inhibit on the tqxtractiun ._,litnt*t:,.cr t _)zuI_and was is sut.d prior
to the nominal start time of .M;tncu. er ,,. M,tneu ,.rb ,, 7, and H were
started at the nominal tithes. The ccm_n_azzd wa,_ issued attcr the noz-nin/_l
start tiznc._ for .Maneu,,,..r _ , 7, and '_. In each cast .M.tncu, er , was st;trt_:,t
iznn_ediately ,tnd M;tncu,,crs 7 and - were. delayed t_y the ball'It" asnount _1 ti_::_'
that M,tlluu\er ' was d_.l,_ycd, t',it 1% ot ,,z_,de cod,. 27 w,: bet properly ill
e,,ery case. The y, ,min,tl start tinge deltas a,',. z,,,tintam,.,! tmlebs ,,roun,[
con_mand mant.u, t*rb or _pac_'cralt _ontrol ,tre intcrbl,vrsed with tht, bt-
nlaneil,, e r b,
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Multiple t:ommands were issued in Tin_c qase 4, The first command
, removed the inhibit on the extraction maneuver, Thu sul)sequent
commands were properly accepted, but had no furtlwr effect, The
command was issu,zd in Time _ase 5, but it was properly rejected
and error code ,'4 was issued.
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SECTION 1 1
REAL TIME TELEMETRY AND DATA COMPRESSION
Ii. I INTRODUCTION
The flight program correctly provides telemetry and data compression.
Verification of this activity is described in the following paragraphs.
11.2 TELEMETRY SYSTEM INTERFACE
The adequacy of flight program telemetry control and timing was proven
by the analysis of Sire Lab runs of past programs tLrough the use of
telemetry.
ii.3 IDENTIFICATION TAGS
The telemetry data is correctly issued using specific tags called PIO
(process input/output) tags. The flight program controls only portions
of the composite 40 bit telemetry word, the remaining parts being
formed by the telemetry system hardware. Verification was accomplished
by ensuring that a specific PIO tag and mode register setting identified
the correct parameter and that the data was properly scaled for subsequent
ground station reduction.
The correspond_ ,ce between parameter, PIO tag and mode register
setting was verified by checking the tabled data in the flight program against
the tabled requirements in the EDD. A careful n_onitoring of changes to
the EDD telemetry tables and symbolic tape compare of the implementation
of these changes was used to ensure a fixed tag/quantity definition.
11. 4 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LVDC AND LVDA TELEMETRY
LVDC telemetry correctly adheres to the general requirements specified
by the EDD.
II. 4. l LVDC Telemetry
The 6D/LVDC simulator monitors the length of time between execution of
telemetry PIO instructions; therefore, all 6D/LVDC runs were checked for
an insufficiency of time (less than 4. 25 milliseconds) between these
instructions.
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iI.4. I. i LVDC Regularly Scheduled/When Computed Telemetry
Correct implementation of the requirements for regularly scheduled/when
computed telemetry was checked using the 6D/LVDC simulator. Naviga-
tion, guidance, accelerometer, IGM, mode code and special parameter
telemetry was verified through analysis of the outputs obtained from simu-
lation p--ccessing. For each flight phase, a comparison of the specified
parameters and those monitored during the simulation was made to ensure
that the flight program conforms to telemetry requirements.
Ii. 4. I. 2 LVDC On-Occurrence Telemetry
Telemetry indicating execution of a flight sequence event was verified
through analysis of both nominal and perturbed simulations designed to
cause the required condition. The format of data, identification codes
and real-time clock readings were checked for discrete input and output
registers, interrupt register, switch selector register, switch selector
feedback register, and special event telemetry.
11.5 DATA COMPRESSION
Data con_pression specifications were verified using compressed data
] from nominal flight simulations and from a series of perturbations designed
to test data table overflows, data dump rates, and compression of data for
on occurrence events. The results of the data compression are discussed
below and also in Section 10.4. 14.
11.5. 1 General Data Compression Requirements
The telemetered compressed data tables were checked by monitoring the
time, identification code and data formats. The table length and the maxi-
mum compression period was verified by monitoring compressed data
telemetry after table wraparound. The program correctly stores ana
telemeters all data types v-ith the associated time.
11.5.2 Data to be Compressed
Time compressed (Group A), occurrence compressed (Group B) and
amplitude compressed (Group C) data were verified using both nominal
and perturbed simulations. Verification of each group is disucssed in
the following paragraphs.
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11.5.2.1 Group A: Time Compressed Data
Group A data was obtained from the nominal simulation. Fine and backup
gimbal angle data and accelerometer data were checked to verify correct
compression rates.
11.5.2.2 Group B: Occurrence Cow.pressed Data
Group B data was forced in a series of simulations designed to verify
correct storage of event data. Storage of discrete output register changes
and both tabled and generalized switch selector data was ensured. TLC
HOP constant compression was verified by checking the flight program
logic flow.
ll._.Z. 3 Group C: Amplitude Compressed Data
Group C data was verified using both nominal and perturbed simulations
to check compression of each function specified. Sample and storage
rates for the functions of this group were checked by forcing system
failures for MC24 and the Error Monitor Register and by setting and
resetting various discrete input regxster bits.
11.5.3 Telemetry of Compressed Data
The con_pressed data tables are correctly telemetered three times when-
ever the compressed data dump DCS command is received. The issuance
of the compressed data telemetry was verified by checking the mode
register setting, the telemetry PIOtags and the sequence in which the
compressed data table locations were selected for telemetry.
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SECTION IZ
PREFLIGHT TESTS
Verification of the preflight routines is not a requirement in flight program
verification. It was verified that the non-repeatable sim flight and repea-
table sire flight modes do not interact with the flight mode. Section I-3
describes additional verification performed in the preflight prepare-to-
launch routines.
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SECTION 13
' ALCO ITHMS N 75 33 1 2 5
:3. I INTRODUCTION
This section describes the algorithms used in the flight program to approxi-
mate elementary functions and mathematical procedures. The implementa-
tion of these algorithms was checked by verifying that at least one, and in
most cases, more than one function computed through the use of the algorithm
is calculated properly.
13.Z SINE-COSINE ALGORITHM
The sine-cosine algorithm was verified by forcing input arguments in each
quadrant and at 0°, 90 ° , 180 ° , and 270 ° and the results checked against
tables. This algorithm is correctly used to obtain terms for the coordinate
transformation matrices and verification was completed by checking the re-
sMts of these transformations.
13.3 ARCTANGENT ALGORITHM
The arctangcnt algorithm,wa_ verified by inputtingvarious values for
the numerator and denominator arguments. This algorithm was tested
in each quadrant and at 0°, 90°, 180° and 270°and the results checked
against tables. This algorithm is used in the calculation of the range
angle (_i),the desired vehicle pitch and yaw attitude(Xy and Xz) and
the track local horizontal guidance commands upon return of control
from S/C to IU. The verificationof the calculation of these quantities
completed the arctangent algorithm verification.
13.4 NATURAL LOGARITHM ALGORITHM
The natural logarithm algorithm was verified by inputting test arguments of
1, less than 1, greater than 1 and the two end points. Verification of these
logarithms and the correct calculation of the intermediate IGM terms _f
velocity-to-be-gained (L 1 and L3) ensured the proper implementation of
this algorithm.
13-I
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13. r_ SQUARE ROOT ALGORITttM
This algorithm was verified by inputting positive, negati,,e and zero ar,_,uments
and checking the results for accuracy. The values for desired yaw attitude
(Xz), relative velocity(Vr), and position {R) were also checked to complete
the verification.
13.6 INVERSE SQUARE ROOT ALGORITHM
The inverse square root algorithm is correctly im_!emented in the calculations
for the inverse of the vehicle's radius from the center of the earth (l/R). Veri-
fication was accomplished by hand checking these calculations at initialization,
during boost and during orbit.
13.7 VECTOR DOT PRODUCT
Several test cases were run using known vectors to verify the results from the
vector dot product algorithm. Since the vector dot product is used in the rota-
tion of gravity acceleration into the injectS.on system and thc gravity accelera-
tions affect the guidance commands, correct IGM performance also indirectly
vpri/ied the implementation of the vector dot product.
13.8 VECTOR CROSS PRODUCT
The transformation from one coordinate system to another is correctly accomp-
lished by use of the vector cross product algorithm. The checks of these trans-
formation matrices and the exercise of the algorithm using several known vec-
tors assured the correct implementation Gf the cross product.
13-Z
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APPENDIX B
PERFORMANCE CASES
1. +5% thrust and mass flow rates in both stages
'! Z. -5% thrust and mass flow rates ill both stages
3. High stop PMR (HPMR) for duration of S-IVB
4. Low stop PMR (LPMR) for duration of S-IVB
5. Allaccelerometer hard failure (zero change), A channel
6. X accelerometer hard failure (zero change), both channels
7. Y accelerometer hard failure (zero change), both channels
8. Z acceteromcter hard failure (zero change), both channels
9. Engine #1 out at Tl+5
10. Engine #6 out at liftoff
11. Engine #4 out at Tl+40
12. Engines #1 and ,_5 out at TI+100
13. Fine gimbal failure, fly on backups
14. +2° fl bias, +1° _ bias
P P
15. -2° fl bias,-1° _ bias
P P
16. S-IB engine #1 actuator hardover inboard at 10 seconds
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APPENDIX C
PERFORMANCE CASE ANALYSIS
CASE #I - +5% THRUST AND MASS FLOW RATE FOR BOTI! STACES
This case was accomplished by simulating a 5% increase in the nominal
thrust and mass flow rate of both the S-IB and S-IVB stage. As a result
of the increased mass flow rate, the S-IB stage propellant low level
sensor was activated at TB]+]Z6.43 seconds, prior to the associated low
level sense interrupt being hardware and software enabled at TBI+]27.86
seconds. Inboard engines cutoff occurred as scheduled at TB2+3.0 seconds,
but fuel depletion occurred at TBZ+3. 20 seconds, prior to the associated
interrupt and discrete input being hardware and software enabled. The
enable did not occur until TB2+4.5 seconds. The S-IB outboard engine
out discrete input (DII4) was detected causing the expanded zero test to
be used in accelerometer processing fo- one computation cycle. S-IVB
cutoff occurred at TCRR+566.96 seconds. The flight program correctly
con_.pensated for this increase in thrust as acceptable end conditions were
achieved.
l CASE #Z - -5To THRUST AND N_\SS FLOW RATE IN BOTH STAGES
This case was accomplished by simulating a 5°', decrease in the nomln, tl
thrust and mass flow rate in both the S-IB and S-IVD stages. As a result,
fuel depletion of the S-IB stage occurred at TB2--7. 470 seconds, 7. 937
seconds later than nominal. In addition, the S-IVB stage burned 31. 738
seconds longer than nominal with fuel depletion occurring at TCRR:
640.339 seconds, 2.348 seconds before the calculated cutoff. Therefore,
unacceptable end conditions were achieved.
CASE #1 HICH STOP PMR (IIPMR) FOR DURATION OF S-IVB
This case was simulated by forcing a high propellant mixture ratio
(HPMR) for the duration of the S-IVB burn. Due to the higher thrust
and mass flow rate, S-IVB cutoff occurred at TCRR+582.832 seconds,
17.828 seconds earlier than nominal. Satisfactory end conditions were
achieved, indicating that the flight program correctly compensated for
the high PMR.
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iCASE t14 - LOW STOP PMR (LPMR) FOIl DURATION OF S-IVB
This case was simulated by forcing a low propellant mixture ratio
(LPMR) for the duration of the S-IVB burn. Due to the _mproper
' mixture ratio, the S-IVB fuel depleted at approximately TGRR+669.043
seconds. At fuel depletion, T3i , was equal to 5. 24 indicating that 5. 24
seconds of additional burn time was required to reach cutoff. With th,.
exception of the early depletion, the flight program correctly compensat,,d
for the low PMR,
CASE #5 - ALL ACCELEROMETER HARD FAII.URE (A CIIANNNI.I
In this case the A-accelerometer channel in the X, Y and Z axes were
frozen to zero at liftof ¢. Whenever [._A-._B[>2, the channel nearest
the expected reading was used in computing velocity and position in
that axis and the appropriate Mode Code 24 bits were set. Since ._A
was forced to zero, the disagrc, ement test was failed when I._B [>2.
Whenever [._A-._BI<3, the A channel reading was selected and the
appropriat_ MC24 bits were reset. Therefore, when [._B[< 3, a zero
reading was used in computing velocity and position in that axis.
End conditions telemetered by the LVDC compared favor, bly with the
desired end conditions. However, "actaal" end conditions indicat . by
the 6D were perturbed sufficiently that the orbit attained was slightly
undesirable. All flight sequencing was correct.
CASE H6 - X-ACCELEROMI.;TER tIARD FAII.IIRI2 (BOTtt CtIANNt-2I.S)
In the comFutation cycle following GRR, the X-accelerom_.ter A and B
channels were frozf, n to force zero acc-leromete, r r_,adings, sim_latin_,
failure conditions. The accelcrometer zero test correctly detected the
zero readings as failure indications, and s_.t bits 2, 3, and 23 in Mode.
Code word 24. the SMC calculations were inhibited and the backup
acceleration, (F/M) c, was used to compute tI;e velocity and position
in the X-axis.
Whenever the accelerometer zero test was disabled or when i_p-90c_< 2 °,
the zero accelerornf,ter readings in the X-axis were accepted and w,.r_.
used in computing position and w, locity in the X dir_,ction. Bits 2, 3 and
23 of Mode Code 24 were, reset and bit 10 of Mode. Code 2_ was sq.t when
the SMC calculations became actiw_.
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As a result of using the erroneous zero readings when the zero test
was disabled or when 18p-90°J<2 ° and using (F/M) c during all other
periods of flight, large navigation errors developed in the X direction.
The X navigation errors caused slightly incorrect gravitational com-
ponents to be used in the other axes thus causing small navigation
errors in the Y and Z directions. As a result, the end cond;tions
achieved were not suitable for comparison with nominal end conditions.
S-IVB cutoff occurred at TGRR+601.465 seconds, . 804 seconds later
than nominal.
All sequencing was executed prope, rly and there were no deviations from
specifications.
CASE II7 - Y-ACCELEROMETHR ILARD I:'AII.UF, E (BOTH CHANNI.:I.S)
In the computation cycle following GRR, the Y-acceleromet,.r was
frozen in both the A and B channels, resulting in zero readings. The
accelerometer zero test correctly detected the zero readings as
failure indications. The zero accelerometer readings in the Y-axis
were rejected whenever the accelerometer zero test was t.nabled and
[8 yawl >2°. Bits 4, 5 and 19 of MC24 were set, the SMC calculations
were inhibited, and the (F/M) c backup profile was used to calculate
position and velocity in the Y direction.
The zero accelerometer readings in the Y-axis were accept(.d and us,.d
in computing position and velocity in the Y direction whenev(.r the
accelerometer zero test was disabled or when J0yawl<Z °. Bits 4,
and 19 of MC24 remained reset during the BML.
Large navigation errors developed in the Y direction as a result of
using the erroneous zero readings when the zero test was disabled or
when [6yawJ<Z °, antl using (F/M) c during all other periods of flight.
The LVDC end conditions attained were good. The 6I) end conditions
were slightly perturbed as a result of the navigation errors, althou_:h
they were still acceptable, This case demonstrated the capability of
the flight program to handle a Y-accelerometer hard failure and still
attain acceptabh: end conditions.
S-IVB cutoff occurred at TGRR+600. 763 sc.conds which was near nominal
cutoff time. All flight sequencing was correct.
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I CASE #8 - Z-ACCEI_EROMETER I-bXRI) FAILURE (BOTt! CtLANNEI.S)
In thi,_ case, the Z-acceleromcter was failed to zt._o izi the comp. cyci_.
iollowing GRR. Both the A and B channels were frozen to force zero
readings.
The accelerometer zero test co"rectly detected the Z-accelerometer
zero readings as failure indications. Whenever the accelerometer zero
*est was enabled and [e_[>2 °, the zero accelerometer readings in the
Z-axis were rejected. P'12he sign bit, bit 1 and bit 22 of MC24 were set,
the SMC calculations were inhibited, and (F/M) c was correctly substituted
for F/M. The resultant acceleration component is correctly used in
the calculation of position and velocity in the Z direction. Whenever
the accelerometer zero test was disabled or [_pl<2 °, the zero readintts
in the Z-axis were accepted and the slim bit, bit 1 and bit 22 of MC:24
were reset.
Large navigation errors developed in the Z direction as a result of
using the erroneous zero readings when the zero test was disabled and
when I(_p[< 2 ° and using (F/M) c durin_ all other periods of flight•
The S-IVB fuel depleted at TGRR+i,05. 817 seconds, with T3i equal to
• 86 seconds.
CASE i!9 - FNGINt.7. !ll OUT AT Tl+5 SECONDS
Engine ill lost thrust at TI+5 seconds and was properly detected at
that time. The tilt freeze tnterval, .'_Tf, was correctly cor._p'ated to bt,
12. 86_ seconds and was implenlented at Tc+30. 417 seconr_s, with tilt
arrest occurring at Tc4122. 47-5 s,.conds. S-IB fu,.1 depl,,tton occt_rr, d
at TGRR+178. 867 seconds, 21. a,_9 seconds later than nominal. The
S-IVB stage depleted fuel at TGI{R*¢;27. 203. T3i at this ttn_,, was
approximatt.ly 3. 74, indicating that 3. 74 additional seconds of burn tm_,.
would have been required to reach cutoff. The flight program proovrlv
corrected for the engine, out and p(.rforn_,.d properly up to fur. 1 ¢lv,olt.tion.
CASE _10 ENGIN_ t_60U'F AT I.IFTOFF
This case was accomplished by simulating the failure of _-IB engine.
//6 (inboard) at TBI40.0 seconds. As a rt.sult, the tilt frveze intvrval,
_Tf, was computed to be 13. 87-5 seconds with tilt arrest, Tar, dulini:
the boost major loop commencirg at TBI .!3, 10. 8 svconds latvr
C°4
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than nominal. S-IB fuel depletion occurred at TGRI'.+178. 18, 20.
seconds later than nominal. S-IVB fuel depletion occurred at TGRR*
626 (,9 seconds, with T3I-3. 83 seconds. All flight at'qurncing was
corFect.
CASE _11 - ENGINE //4 OUT AT 40 3ECONDS FROM I.IFTOFF
This case was accomplished by simulating the failure of S-IB engine
,#4 (outboard) at TB "_+40.03 seconds. Tilt arrest occurred during the.
boost major loop commencing at TBI+108.02 seconds (tilt freeze
interval, _Tf, was zero). S-IB fuel depletion occurred at TGRP +173. 43,
wl-.:ch is 16.15 seconds later th.'m nominal. S-IVB cutoff occ-rred at
TGRR+620.46 seconds, 19.8 seconds later than nominal. Acceptabb.
end conditions were achieved.
CASF #12 ENGINES t!l AND i_5 OUT AT '.00 St.:CQNDS FROM I.IFTOI.'I ._
This cast: was accomplished by simulating the failure of S-IB eneinvs
#1 (outboard) and q5 (inboard) at TB!4100.0.', seconds. The tilt frerz_.
interval, ATf, was calculated to be 0.0 and tilt arrest, Tar, occurred
] at TGRR+125. 34 seconds. S-IB ftlel depletion occurred at TGRR4
171, 996, 14.7 seconds la'er than nomil;al. The S-IVB engine cutoff
occurred at TGRl{*¢,lS. 50, 17. 84 seconds later than nomtz.al. The
S-IVB burned only 3. 12 srconds lonl'e r than nominal dtle *o the two
S-IB engines out. End conditions achiewed were satisfactory.
CASE #13 FINE GIMBAI. FAII.URE, FI.Y ON BACKUt_S
This case was si.auulated by failure of the X, Y and Z finr taimbaln so
that the w.hicle would fly using the backup gtmbals. Th,. flight progran_
correctly responded to this condition, with S-IVB cutoff occur:-in_ only
.08 second later than nominal at "FGRR4,,00. 74. l_roper fligh' ar(,gram
resnonse was demonstrated in that acc,.ptabh, end conditions w,.r,.
noted with little change in vehicle pt, rformance.
CASE t/14 - 42 ° _p BIAS, 41 ° 0 BIASP
This case was simulated by perturbing th,. pitch gimbal angh. (, F) by
1 ° and the no:,zle deflection (r_pl by 2° . The flight program corrrctlv
responded to this condition with S-IVB cutoff occurring, at TCIt{R-,,0". *3,
2. 33 seconds later than nominal, t_roper flight program conapit_Aton
i
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of steering misalignment correction (SMC) terms was demonstrated in
that acceptable end conditions were achieved, with the perturbation
,,aving little effect on flight program performance. The pitch SMC
terms were significantly larger than nominal.
CASE #15 - -2° Bp BIAS, -I o @ BIASP
This case was simulated by perturbing the pitch gimbal angle (@p) by -I °
and the nozzle deflection (6p) by -2°. The flight program correctly
responded to this condition with S-IVB cutoff occurring at TGRR+602. 86,
2.20 seconds later than nominal. Proper flight program computation of
steering nlisalignment correction (SMC) terms was demonstrated in
that acceptable end conditionb were achieved, with the perturbation
having littleeffect on flight program performance. The pitch SMC terms
were significantly Larger than nominal.
CASE #16 - +2 ° 8y BTAS, Jrl ° 0 BIASY
This case was simulated by perturbing the yaw gimbal angle (Oy) +1 °
and the yaw nozzle deflection (@_ +2 °. As a result, fuel deDletion of
the S-IB stage occurred at TB2=6.742 seconds, 0. 014 seconds earlier
than nominal. In addition, the S-IVB stage burned 2. 339 seconds long r
than nominal with cutoff occurring at TGRR=603.008 seconds, ttowever,
the flight program correctly compensated for these biases as acceptable
end condition_ were achieved.
CASE #17 -2° B BIAS, -I° @ B:AS
Y Y
This caae was simulated by perturbing the yaw gimbal angle (@y) -i°
and the yaw nozzle deflection (By) -2°• &s a result, fuel depletion of
the S-IB stage occurred at TB2=6.752 seconds, 0.024 seconds earlier
than nominal. In addition, the S-IVB stage burned 3. 408 seconds longer
than nominal with cutoff occurring at TGRR=6n4. 068 seconds. Howew'r,
' the flight program correctly compensated for these biases as acceptaMe
end conditions were achieved.)
4
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I CASE #18 - S-IB ENGINE #1 ACTUATOR HARDOVER INBOARD AT
SEVEN SECONDS FROM LIFTOFF
This case was simulated by forcing the pitch and yaw actuators of
engine #i to a value of 8 degrees in a negative direction. As a result,
fuel depletion of the S-IB stage occurred at TB2=6. 801 seconds, 0.044
seconds later than nominal. In addition, the S-IVB stage burned 1.220
seconds longer than nominal _4th cutoff occurring at TGRR=601. 919
seconds. However, the flight program correctly compensated for this
failure as acceptable end conditions were achieved.
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APPENDIX D
END CONDITIONS COMPARISON
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE CASE ERRORS
Flight Azimuth- ;5. 158 °
(De sired -Achieved)
Parameter A V T AR T A@T A I AR
Units M/S M Deg. Deg. Deg.
Desired
Values 7818.46 65281 78.0 0.0 51. 78 156. 887
Case
1 -.29 -7.64 -.0042 -.0024 -0.0036
2 S-IVB Fuel Depletion
3 .186 3.46 -.00083 -.0027 -.0039
4 S-IVB Fuel Depletion
5 .128 28. 89 .0033 .0001 0.0
5-6D_:: -II.82 -_445. 6 -.1726 -.0108 -.0066
6 .068 II.38 -.00016 -.0034 -.0053
6-6D::: 8. 70 I1788.4 -.2216 -.0082 -.0086
7 -.093 29.26 .00013 -.0169 -.0261
7-6D-_:: -.14 60.55 .00074 -.0317 -.0120
8 S-IVB Fuel Depletion
8- 6D ::'- S-IVB Fuel Depletion
9 S-7VB Fuel Depletlon
10 S-IVB Fuel Depletion
II -. 122 30. 36 .0029 -.0006 .0010
12 .043 28.5 .0034 -.0013 .0022
13 .12 35.4 .0014 -.0006 -.0011
14 -.107 43.4 .0056 .0004 .0006
15 -.065 12. 73 .00014 -.0002 -.00045
16 -.14 35.3 .003 -.001 -,002
17 -.32 37.8 .003 .001 .002
18 .08 20. 1 .002 .001 .001
:kAccelerometer failure cases, 6D data included for comparison
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APPENDIX E
UNCORRECTED DEVIA_I "ONS
ASTP-1 In TB2 if an accelerometer "zero" reading ( A of 0 or 1 bit)
occurs near S-IB [ECO, the accelerometer zero reading may
fail the zero test even if the reading should be acceptable.
K the SIB IEC0 occurs between the computation of the expected
accelerometer change, VF, and the computation of the thrust
misalignment uncertainty in the estimated accelerometer
change, AC0 , the value for F/M could be changed between the
two computations. This is due to F/M being set to a constant
at IECO. Thus, the comparison of VK, with AC0 , would not
be valid, possibly resulting in the accelerometer readine
incorrectly failing the zero test.
ASTP-2 The Execute Generalized Maneuver DCS command may be enabled
at a time different than TSS=2905.0 in TBS. The enable for this
command is scheduled, in the Time Base 5 module, by adding
TLDD+THDI)+63. 5+2905.0 seconds in TBS. This will be the
correct time if the safing sequence is started after complation
(full duration) of the L0K and Ltt 2 dumps specified in the S-IV/
] IU De-orbit DCS Command. This will not be TSS+290_ if the
safing sequence is star[ed by one of the other three conditions
sta_ed in Note 6 of the switch selector table:
1. TLDD:0.0
Z. DELVR test
3. THD D = 0.0
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APPENDIX F
i
NOMINAL SEOIIFNCE OF MAJOR KVFNTS
ASTP 45. 158 Degree Azimuth Nominal
Event Nominal Time Nominal Tim,
in Time Base from GRR
(seconds) (seconds)
Guidance Reference Release TB0+0.00 0.00
Time Base 1 Initiated TB0+17.67 17.67
Pitch and Roll Initiation TBI+8.79 26.40
Roll Maneuver Complete TBl+57.47 75. 14
Computer Switch Point !il TBl+99.96 117. 63
Computer Switch Point #2 TBI+100. 17 117.84
Computer Switch Point _ 3 TBI+119.9_ 137. _,3
Tilt Arrest TBI+128. 11 145.78
(Tc+129.73)
Time Base 2 Initiated TBl+13Z.87 150. 54
S-IB Inboard Engines Cutoff TBZ 153. 51
S-IB Outboard Engines Cutoff TBZ+t_. 74 157.28
Time Base 3 Initiated TBZ+6.74 157.28
S-IVB Ullage Ignition TB3+I. 0b 158.34
S-IB/S-IVB Separation TB3+1.26 158.54
S-IVB Engine Start Sequence Initiated TB3+2.67 159.9_
S-IVB Ullage Rockets Jettison TB3 f13.27 170. _5
IGM Start TB3+34.67 191.95
Computer Switch Point _-'4 T B3+4 I.9(; 199.24
SMC Start TB3+(,0.07 217.3q
Computer Switch Point ;15 TB3+203. (,_> 3t,0.94
TII=0, Initiate PMRC TB3+328.06 48_. 34
Begin Chi-Bar Steering TB3+419.74 577.02
S-IVB Cutoff TB3+443.3_ ¢,00.t,,
Time Base 4 Initiated 'FB34443._,0 600.,_'-
Track Local Reference Start TB4+lS. 11 61r_,o9
i|
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